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Introduction
This thesis is devoted to fragmentalism, a non-standard tense realism
introduced by Kit Fine (2005).1 Before we start, let me stress that I will
not argue for fragmentalism here; I will simply assume it as a working
hypothesis. Accordingly, I will tend to set aside the objections recently
raised against it,2 despite the fact that I find some of them convincing.
In the first three chapters, I will show how to develop a fragmen-
talist version of presentism – which I will call fragmentalist presentism
– in order to face some of the problems usually ascribed to standard
presentism. In particular, the goal of the first chapter (which is largely
based on ‘Fragmentalist Presentism and the Correspondence Theory of
1 See also Fine (2006).
2 See, in particular, Tallant (2013), Correia and Rosenkranz (2012), Lipman (2015),
and Deng (2013).
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Truth’, an unpublished manuscript co-authored with Giuliano Torrengo)
is to search for a way to reconcile the correspondence theory of truth
(hereinafter, CTT), i.e., the thesis that truth supervenes on facts, with a
presentist metaphysics. According to what I will call unrestricted CTT,
the truth of past- and future-tensed sentences supervenes – respectively
– on past and future facts. Since the standard presentist denies the exis-
tence of past and future entities (and facts concerning them that do not
obtain in the present), she seems to lack the resources to accept both
past- and future-tensed true sentences and unrestricted CTT. I will ar-
gue that by endorsing fragmentalist presentism one can uphold past- and
future-tensed truths together with unrestricted CTT.
In the second chapter (a revised version of ‘The Invisible Thin Red
Line’, another unpublished manuscript co-authored with Giuliano Tor-
rengo), I argue that the adoption of an unrestricted principle of bivalence
is compatible with a metaphysics that (i) denies that the future is real, (ii)
adopts nomological indeterminism, and (iii) exploits a branching struc-
ture to provide a semantics for future contingent claims. To this end, I
will show how to reconcile – within Fine’s non-standard tense realism –
a genuinely A-theoretic branching-time model with the idea that there is
a branch corresponding to the thin red line, that is, the branch that will
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turn out to be the actual future history of the world.
Many four-dimensionalists think of continuants as mereological sums
of stages from diﬀerent times. These sums would perdure, that is, they
would persist by having diﬀerent stages. This view is generally taken to be
incompatible with presentism: if there is no time except the present, then
nothing can be a sum of such stages. The aimof the third chapter is to
show that fragmentalist presentism provides us with the tools to reconcile
a presentist metaphysics and (a non-standard version of) perdurantism.
In the last chapter, I will extend the fragmentalist approach to modal-
ity, by analysing the modal analogue of fragmentalist presentism. The
simplest quantified modal logic is generally regarded as incompatible
with actualism, the view that everything there is is actual. It is usu-
ally held thatwhoever wants to preserve the former while embracing the
latter is somehow bound to enrich the inventory of theworld with entities
able to play the role traditionally ascribed to possibilia: abstract individ-
ualities or contingently non-concrete entities. I will hold that there is an-
other way to reconcile actualism and the simplest quantified modal logic
(a way that commits us to accept neither abstract individualities nor
contingently non-concrete entities), by exploiting whatwe might call frag-
mentalist actualism.
1Fragmentalism, Presentism,
and the Correspondence Theory of Truth
1.1 Presentism and the Correspondence Theory of Truth
Borrowing Fine (2005: 299)’s terminology, I will treat standard presen-
tism as the conjunction of the following two theses:
Ontic Presentism Only present entities exist.
Factive Presentism Only tensed facts obtaining at present constitute reality.3
Consider the tensed fact that Alan is sitting – as opposed to the tenseless
fact that Alan is sitting at t. In the light of factive presentism, if Alan is
3 As Fine (2005: 300) underlines, while factive presentism is compatible with the
negation of ontic presentism (notoriously, non-presentist ontologies such as the moving
spotlight view and the growing block view maintain that presently obtaining facts are
somehow privileged), ontic presentism makes sense only if factive presentism holds.
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now sitting, reality is constituted by the fact that Alan is sitting. Under
the hypothesis that it is true now that in a few minutes Alan will be
standing, can the presentist accept the future fact that corresponds now
to such a future-tensed truth? It depends on how we read ‘future fact’.
A future fact in a weak sense is a future-tensed fact that obtains at
present. If Alan will be standing in a few minutes, the fact that Alan
will be standing obtains at present – and hence it constitutes reality now.
A future fact in a strong sense is a present-tensed fact that will obtain
in the future. If Alan will be standing in a few minutes (and he is sitting
now), the fact that Alan is standing will obtain in a few minutes: it will
constitute reality, which it does not now.4 Hence, if factive presentism
holds, the fact that Alan is standing does not constitute reality. In other
words, it is incompatible with factive presentism to accept future facts
in the strong sense; and analogously for past facts in the strong sense.
4 For the distinction between weak and strong facts, see Ciuni and Torrengo (2013).
Here I will focus on tensed facts only, which are the only kind of facts for which it
makes sense to distinguish between facts that obtain in the present, in the past, and
in the future. A tenseless fact such as the fact that Alan is sitting at t is such that
either it does not make sense to talk about it as obtaining in the present rather than
in the past or in the future, or it obtains indiﬀerently in the past, in the present, and
in the future.
Fragmentalism, Presentism, and the Correspondence Theory of Truth 3
Still, factive presentists can accept past and future facts in the weak
sense, since they are facts that obtain at present. The correspondence
theory of truth (CTT) states that truth supervenes on facts. According to
what we could call unrestricted CTT, while the truth of present-tensed
sentences supervenes on present facts, the truth of past- and future-
tensed sentences supervenes, respectively, on past and future facts. If
we read ‘past’ and ‘future’, respectively, as ‘past in the weak sense’ and
‘future in the weak sense’, then factive presentists seem to have the re-
sources for maintaining unrestricted CTT. Past-tensed truths, as well as
future-tensed ones, would be nothing but present truths supervening on
presently obtaining past- or future-tensed facts.
However, accepting such past- and future-tensed facts is problematic
for someone who also accepts ontic presentism, namely for a presentist
tout court. If facts are complex entities – as most agree5 – it seems that
the most plausible candidates as constituents of past- and future-tensed
facts are, respectively, past and future entities. If so, accepting that
among the facts that presently obtain there are past- and future-tensed
ones would entail accepting that past and future entities exist, contrary
5 See Correia and Mulligan (2013).
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to what ontic presentism holds.6
Notoriously, many versions of standard presentism are compatible
with the acceptance of past and future facts in the weak sense. Ac-
cording the so-called “Lucretian” position (Bigelow 1996), for instance,
the mereological sum of all the presently existing entities presently in-
stantiates properties like being such that Alan was sitting or being such
that Alan will be standing. Such properties, which are taken to be an
irreducible part of reality, would provide a supervening base for the past-
tensed truth that Alan was sitting and the future-tensed truth that Alan
will be standing by being presently exemplified by that sum. No non-
present entities would be required to allow the supervenience of truth
upon being. Rather, past- and future-tensed truths would supervene
on how the world is now, namely on past and future facts in the weak
sense. Another option is to resort to the haecceitist version of ontic
6 Of course, factive presentists who deny ontic presentism do not have a problem
here. Nor may a presentist maintaining that facts are “simple” entities have a problem
here, but of course her solution would be ontologically very costly. A further option
may be to deny the existence of facts altogether. Note that, even though in this
thesis I will use fact-talk, nothing prevents us from resorting to another ontological
category, on the grounds of our preferred metaphysical view (as far as the entities so
introduced are taken to instantiate fundamental properties and relations).
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presentism, which treats past and future entities as uninstantiated “this-
nesses” (Adams 1986), or to resort to what we could call non-serious
ontic presentism, which thinks of past and future objects as Meinongian
non-existent entities. Still another strategy is to hold that present truths
together with laws of nature necessitate past- and future-tensed truths
(Markosian 2013). This approach allows us to uphold the existence of a
supervenience base for such truths without dropping ontic presentism (as
far as we are willing to embrace some form of nomological determinism).
But all these options share a fundamental problem. If the past- and
future-tensed facts are made up exclusively of entities that the presentist
can accept (i.e., presently existing things and presently instantiated prop-
erties), she is bound to drop the requirement of “aboutness” regarding
what tensed truths supervene on. In short, at the root of the about-
ness objection against ontic presentism there is the idea that past- and
future-tensed truths are about past and future entities and not presently
existing things or present instantiations of properties (Merricks 2007:
137-138, Sanson and Caplan 2011). Therefore, if such truths have a su-
pervening base then it must concern past and future entities respectively.
But no version of standard presentism is compatible with accepting the
existence of past and future entities, and so neither is compatible with
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the requirement of aboutness. Dropping the requirement of aboutness
while maintaining unrestricted CTT seems an ad hoc move, since the
two theses justify each other. After all, why should we think that truths
modally co-vary with facts, if we do not care about the relation between
what true propositions are about and the facts their truth supervenes on?
The combination of standard presentism and unrestricted CCT proves to
be highly problematic.
What about non-standard versions of presentism? As we will see,
non-standard presentists radically modify our understanding of both on-
tic presentism and factive presentism. I will argue that, within the non-
standard framework that Kit Fine (2005) calls fragmentalism, the pre-
sentist can finally accept past and future facts in the strong sense, so
reconciling unrestricted CTT and ontic presentism.
1.2 Fragmentalist Presentism
Factive presentism can be thought of as the standard form of tense real-
ism, that is, the tenet that irreducibly tensed facts constitute a coherent
reality in an absolute sense. Turning to a slightly more precise framework,
I will follow Fine in treating standard tense realism as the conjunction
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of the following three theses (2005: 271):7
Realism Reality is constituted (at least, in part) by tensed facts.
Absolutism The constitution of reality is an absolute matter, i.e. not rel-
ative to a time or other form of temporal standpoint.
Coherence Reality is not contradictory, it is not constituted by facts with
incompatible content.
As Fine underlines, these claims are jointly incompatible with the idea
that facts obtaining at any time constitute reality in the same way,
namely the following thesis (p. 271):
Neutrality No time is privileged, the tensed facts that constitute reality
are not oriented towards one time as opposed to another.
Without going into the details, it is easy to see that Realism, when cou-
pled with Absolutism and Coherence, gives rise to a version of McTaggart
(1908)’s Paradox in the presence of Neutrality. If some qualitative vari-
ation through time occurs, reality will be constituted by incompatible
tensed facts. Suppose for example that at t Alan is sitting, while at t1
he is standing. In the light of Realism, at t the tensed fact that Alan
7 See also Fine (2006: 399-400).
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is sitting obtains, while at t1 the tensed fact that Alan is standing ob-
tains. Assuming both Neutrality and Absolutism, those two incompatible
facts will constitute reality absolutely speaking and not with respect to
a given time. But, under the hypothesis that Coherence holds, reality
cannot contain incompatible facts (Fine 2005: 272).
Standard forms of tense realism reject Neutrality. Standard presen-
tism, as we saw, rejects it in favour of factive presentism (and ontic
presentism). If the present time is privileged, only the facts that obtain
at present constitute reality. Thus if Alan is sitting and then is standing,
it won’t be the case that the fact that Alan is sitting and the fact that
Alan is standing will both constitute reality.
Non-standard forms of tense realism maintain Neutrality, while giv-
ing up either Absolutism or Coherence. Those who reject Absolutism
embrace what Fine (2005: 278-279) calls external relativism. External
relativists think of reality as a plethora of perspectives, each centred on a
time, and the constitution of reality by tensed facts as irreducibly rela-
tive. The crucial point is that incompatible tensed facts constitute reality
only relative to diﬀerent perspectives, and there is no overall perspective
encompassing all of them (such a perspective would be incoherent).
Those who reject Coherence, while keeping Absolutism, adopt frag-
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mentalism (pp. 280-281).8 The fragmentalist gives up the assumption
that reality is “of a piece”. Namely, she maintains that it is divided
up into maximally coherent collections of tensed facts, called fragments.
While each fragment is taken to be internally coherent, the whole of re-
ality is not. In other words, reality would be constituted by irreducibly
incompatible facts, even though such facts can never obtain within the
same fragment (p. 281). Suppose for instance that Alan is now sitting
and then standing. The fragmentalist will describe this case by referring
to two diﬀerent fragments, one containing all the tensed facts that obtain
when the fact that Alan is sitting obtains, and another one containing
all the tensed facts that obtain when the fact that Alan is standing ob-
tains. The fact that Alan is sitting and the fact that Alan is standing
constitute reality in an absolute sense, but there is no fragment in which
they obtain together. In the fragmentalist idiom: ‘within fragment Fm,
the fact that Alan is sitting obtains’, and ‘within fragment Fn, the fact
that Alan is standing obtains’.
While for the standard tense realist obtainment in the present is ob-
tainment simpliciter, to the fragmentalist there is no obtainment sim-
pliciter, but only within a fragment ; yet (contrary to what the external
8 For a critique of Fine’s classification see Correia and Rosenkranz (2012).
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relativist maintains) constitution is understood as absolute. Thus, prop-
erly speaking, past and future facts in the strong sense are facts, since
they constitute reality (even if they do not obtain at present). Note
that in the fragmentalist picture the absolute constitution of reality and
the limited obtainment of tensed facts are understood as two metaphysi-
cally fundamental features. As a whole, reality is incoherent; nevertheless
there is no instance of a “conjunction” of incoherent facts, since along the
temporal dimension reality is divided up into fragments constituted by
facts that cohere with one another.
Among the forms of non-standard tense realism, I will focus on what
I call fragmentalist presentism.9 It is clear that a presentist who endorses
a non-standard version of tense realism must reject factive presentism,
which is incompatible with Neutrality, the idea that no time is privileged.
In particular, according to the fragmentalist variety of non-standard the-
ories, facts that obtain at times diﬀerent from the present constitute
reality in the same sense as facts that obtain at the present time (i.e.,
absolutely). However, within each fragment not all such facts obtain,
9 In Fine’s paper, non-standard versions of tense realism are discussed, but the
idea of ontic presentism in a non-standard framework is not articulated. Non-standard
tense realism is explored also in Pooley (2013) and, more recently, in Tallant (2015).
Fragmentalism, Presentism, and the Correspondence Theory of Truth 11
otherwise fragments wouldn’t be internally coherent. In other words, not
all facts that constitute reality obtain in all fragments. A non-standard
tense realist can exploit this idea to adapt the gist of the presentist posi-
tion to fragmentalism, by embracing a version of ontic presentism (OP)
and factive presentism (FP) within each fragment:
Fragmentalist OP Within each fragment, only present entities exist.
Fragmentalist FP Within each fragment, only presently obtaining facts
obtain.
Someone may reply that fragmentalist presentism is not a genuine version
of presentism, since facts about the existence of past and future entities
do compose reality. But in so far as fragmentalism is a non-standard form
of tense realism, this objection is unfair. The ontology which a tense
realist is committed to depends on the (tensed) facts about existence
that she accepts, i.e., that she accepts as obtaining. Now, while in the
standard framework obtainment is absolute and for a presentist facts
about existence change as time goes by, in the fragmentalist framework
obtainment is irreducibly limited to a given fragment – so that reality
does not cohere with respect to what exists.10
10 One may have the worry that fragmentalism entails some form of commitment
Fragmentalism, Presentism, and the Correspondence Theory of Truth 12
Now, suppose that within a fragment we find both the present-tensed
fact that there are no outposts on Mars and the future-tensed fact that
there will be outposts on Mars, while in a diﬀerent fragment we find the
present-tensed fact that there are outposts on Mars.11 All such tensed
facts constitute reality, but they do not all obtain in a single fragment.
Within the first fragment, future outposts on Mars do not exist at all;
hence, only future facts “about” them in the weak sense obtain. The
corresponding future facts in the strong sense are to be found in the
second fragment, in which we find outposts on Mars as presently existing
entities too, and no past facts about the absence of outposts on Mars in
to non-existing objects in order to avoid contradictory talk, but this is not so. While
present-tensed facts about the first child born in the next century constitute reality
as much as the present-tensed fact that she or he does not (yet) exist, it is not the
case that she has a certain property and she does not exist, since facts about her non
existence never obtain in the same fragments where facts about her having certain
(present-tensed) properties obtain.
11 In order to keep things simple, in this chapter I take the future to be linear. I will
discuss how to develop a tree-like structure of fragments in the next chapter (sections
2.2 and 2.3). In the meanwhile, those who embrace a branching time model can
reformulate the arguments presented here by employing only past-tensed sentences as
examples. Likewise, I set aside any complications due to relativistic considerations as
immaterial to my main point.
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the strong sense obtain.
1.3 The Argument from Truth
In order to see how fragmentalist presentism is compatible with the idea
that past- and future-tensed truths supervene on past and future facts
in the strong sense, I will summarise Fine (2005: 288-298)’s discussion of
the so-called “argument from truth” against tense realism (due to Mellor
1986, 1998), and I will examine the solutions that both external relativism
and fragmentalism provide.
Consider someone who makes an utterance, u1, of the sentence ‘Alan
is standing’ now while Alan is standing, and who has made an utterance
u2 of the same sentence earlier, while Alan was sitting. It seems correct
to say that u1 is true, while u2 was false. Assume that both u1 and u2
state the tensed proposition that Alan is standing, which – like all tensed
propositions – does not encode information about the specific time of its
occurrence. Finally, suppose that the following general principles hold
(Fine 2005: 289-291):
Truth-Value Stability If an utterance is true (false), then it is always true
(false).
Content Stability If an utterance states that P , then it always states
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that P .
Link An utterance is true if and only if what it states is
verified by the facts.
Relevance A tensed utterance is only verified with the help of
tensed facts.
The argument from truth aims to show that these four principles give
rise to contradiction. Let us see how. Given that u1 is true and states the
proposition that Alan is standing, by the left-to-right direction of Link,
there are facts, f1, . . . , fn, that verify that Alan is standing, and given
Relevance those facts are tensed. Since u2 stated the proposition that
Alan is standing, by Content Stability, u2 states that Alan is standing.
Given that f1, . . . , fn verify that Alan is standing, by the right-to-left
direction of Link, u2 is true. But ex hypothesi u2 was false and hence, by
Truth-Value Stability, u2 is false.12
12 Clearly, the tense anti-realist has no need to face this conundrum, since she rejects
Relevance (Fine 2005: 295). According to her, tensed claims, even granting that they
express tensed propositions (i.e., even granting Content Stability), are verified by
tenseless facts. Assume that u1 takes place at time t1 and that it is true. The fact
that verifies it is the fact that Alan is standing at t1. Generally speaking, for any
utterance u of a tensed sentence S, the anti-realist will identify a tenseless fact able
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The standard solution for the tense realist (e.g. Priest 1987) consists
in denying Truth-Value Stability. Fine has arguments against a solution
of this kind, which we do not need to consider here. What I am interested
in is the non-standard solution which he defends, and which consists in
denying Link and endorsing Relative Link instead (p. 295):
Relative Link An utterance is true if and only if what it states is verified
by the facts that obtain at the time of utterance.
Again, in the spirit of the non-standard construal of tense realism, the
assumption that there is a single coherent reality is dropped. Conse-
quently, there is no single set of facts that verifies any utterance. What
Relative Link states is that the reality and the appropriate set of facts
for verifying an utterance vary with the utterance. According to the rela-
tivist version of tense realism, facts never belong to reality in an absolute
manner, but only relative to a temporal perspective or another. And
only the ones belonging to the perspective of an utterance u can verify
to verify the proposition expressed by u – depending both on the time of utterance
and on the tense in S. Since u1 and u2 are utterances of the same (present-tensed)
sentence, but they occur at distinct times, the tenseless facts that verify u1 are not
facts that can verify u2 as well. Therefore, neither Truth-Value Stability nor Content
Stability will rise problems in presence of Link (p. 295).
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the proposition expressed by u. According to the fragmentalist version,
facts belong to reality absolutely speaking, but they do not constitute a
coherent reality, since they do not always obtain conjointly. Given two
facts that constitute reality, it may be that they do not obtain together,
but only within two distinct fragments.
I claim that, in order to adapt Fine’s non-standard solution to the
argument from truth, the fragmentalist presentist can replace Link with
the following:
Fragmentalist Link An utterance is true if and only if what it states is
verified by the facts that obtain within the fragment
in which the utterance takes place.
As I repeat, even granting that fragmentalism maintains that facts con-
stitute reality all in the same sense, it does not follow that, if two facts
belong to reality, then they both obtain in the same fragment. Thus, the
presentist version of fragmentalism posits that the facts able to verify a
given utterance belong to the fragment in which the utterance obtains.
In other words, whether or not an utterance is verified is relative to the
fragment in which it takes place.
Note that from a metaphysical point of view to say that a given
fact verifies an utterance is to say that the fact grounds the truth of
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that utterance. More precisely, the truth of the utterance is grounded in
the facts obtaining within the fragment which the utterance belongs to.
Thus, in the light of the presentist framework I am describing, given a
true utterance the grounding relation is always limited to the fragment in
which the utterance takes place. This is not surprising; after all, we are
exploring a presentist metaphysics, albeit a non-standard one. Limiting
the grounding relation to the fragment in which the utterance takes place
is justified by the very idea at the root of presentism: nothing but the
present exists, and so nothing but the present can function as a ground.
In the fragmentalist idiom: within a given fragment nothing but the
present exists; then, for each true utterance obtaining within it, nothing
but the fragment itself can function as a ground.
For example, a true utterance u of ‘Alan will be standing’ is verified
by the future-tensed fact that Alan will be standing, which obtains in
the same fragment in which u takes place. In general, it is future facts
in the weak sense that ground the present truth of true future-tensed
utterances. Analogously, it is past facts in the weak sense that ground
the present truth of true past-tensed utterances.
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1.4 Topic and Target
The discussion of the fragmentalist solution to the argument from truth
might seem to have led us to a dead end. We were looking for a connection
between true past- and future-tensed propositions and past and future
facts in the strong sense within a non-standard framework, in order to
account for the supervenience of the truth of the former on the latter.
But we ended up with a link – a grounding relation – between past- and
future-tensed propositions and the facts that obtain in the fragments
in which the utterances that express them take place. And given that
fragmentalist factive presentism tells us that within each fragment only
presently obtaining facts obtain, such facts can be past or future facts
only in the weak sense, as noted at the end of last paragraph.
However, the fact that Fragmentalist Link does not make reference
to facts that do not obtain in the present, and hence to past and future
facts in the strong sense, is not incompatible with the claim that past
and future facts in the strong sense are the supervenience base of the
truth of past- and future-tensed propositions. As should be clear from
the above discussion, according to fragmentalism, reality is constituted
by all facts that obtain within any of the fragments, even though there
is no global perspective from which we can say that all facts that belong
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to reality obtain. In Fine (2005: 297)’s words: “In stating that a fact
belongs to reality, we adopt a general perspective, but in stating that
a fact obtains, we adopt the current perspective”. Note that what Fine
here calls the “general perspective” is not a perspective or a fragment
in the sense explained above. If there were such a general perspective
in which all facts that constitute reality obtain, it would contain facts
that are incompatible. But even in the absence of such a global perspec-
tive, present-tensed facts may co-vary with facts about the truth-value
of past- or future-tensed utterances as required by a supervenience rela-
tion between past- and future-tensed utterances and the past and future
facts in the strong sense which they correspond to. So, for instance, if no
fact that Alan is standing were to obtain in some of the fragments that
come “after” the fragment F within which an utterance u of ‘Alan will
be standing’ takes place, u would not be true in F .13
Someone might now object that, much as the grounding relation,
supervenience cannot hold between two diﬀerent fragments, for – as I
have just underlined – there is no general perspective that can function
13 This consideration requires that F be somehow ordered in a “temporal” sequence.
I will explain how to order the fragments by exploiting a “pseudo-earlier-than” relation
in the next chapter (sections 2.2 and 2.3).
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as a metaphysical “bridge” between them. It follows that we cannot find a
supervenience base for past- and future-tensed propositions in a fragment
diﬀerent from the one in which the utterances expressing them take place.
My reply is that, while a grounding claim expresses a relational “second
order” fact (i.e. the fact that a fact f1 grounds a diﬀerent fact f2), a
supervenience claim expresses a mere modal correlation between facts,
or between certain facts and the truth-values of certain claims. More
specifically, the set of facts S that constitutes a supervenience base for
a set of truths T are the facts such that, for each truth p in T , it is
impossible to have a change in the truth-value of p without having a
corresponding change in some of the facts in S. If there is supervenience
between facts in diﬀerent fragments, it does not follow that there is a fact
binding the diﬀerent fragments in an incoherent whole; supervenience just
requires that, within each fragment, the facts co-vary as described.
Therefore – at least in principle – in a fragmentalist framework it is
perfectly coherent to claim that the present truth of a past- or future-
tensed proposition supervenes on the facts that obtain in a fragment dif-
ferent from the one in which the utterance that expresses the proposition
takes place.14 But how can we couple such a claim with Fragmentalist
14 In order to avoid to be overly pedantic, sometimes I talk of true utterances
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Link, which states a verification link between a true utterance and the
facts that obtain in the fragment in which the utterance takes place?
My strategy is to insist that the facts that verify an utterance express-
ing a true proposition are not necessarily those to which the proposition
it expresses corresponds. The problem, then, is to distinguish between
the verification link and the correspondence link.
In fact, correspondence and verification cannot be identified (not even
extensionally). As I have underlined in the first paragraph, I intend the
correspondence between true propositions (that are expressed by tensed
utterances) and facts to entail a supervenience relation between those
two terms. And I have just pointed out that the facts in the superve-
nience base of a proposition p do not need to obtain within the fragment
in which an utterance u that expresses p takes place. But the verifica-
tion relation, as stated in the various versions of the Link theses in the
previous paragraph, is a relation between an utterance u that expresses
a true proposition and a set of facts that obtain in the fragment in which
u takes place.
instead of true propositions, and vice versa. The relation between the two should be
clear: an utterance u takes place within a fragment F and expresses a proposition p,
and u is true if and only if p is verified by the facts that obtain within F .
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That might seem puzzling: it is clear from the discussion of the argu-
ment from truth that the verification relation is not a merely epistemic
link between evidence and true utterances: it is rather a grounding rela-
tion between the truth of the utterances and a given set of facts. Hence,
it would be strange if the facts that verify an utterance are not also
facts upon which the truth of the proposition expressed supervenes; if
only because the verification link (as the correspondence link) is, strictly
speaking, stronger than a supervenience relation (it entails it without
being entailed by it; see Rodriguez-Pereyra 2005: 19).
I completely agree: the past and future facts in the weak sense that
obtain in the fragment in which the utterance takes place modally co-
vary with the truth of the utterance, as we should expect in a case of
supervenience. If in a fragment F the present utterance u of ‘Tomorrow
it will rain’ is true, Fragmentalist Link tells us that within F the fact that
tomorrow it will rain, which verifies u, presently obtains. But if u were
not true, that future fact would not presently obtain within F . However,
the correspondence relation requires only that the supervenience base of
a true proposition p is a set of facts such that it is impossible to have a
diﬀerence in truth-value of the proposition without having a correspond-
ing change in some of the facts in the set. The set of facts that verify the
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utterance u that expresses p is one such set, but it is not the only one. It
may be, and probably is, the only one containing only facts that obtain
within the fragment in which u takes place. But there is a set of facts
among those that do not obtain within the fragment in which u takes
place which are obvious candidates for providing a supervenience base
for the truth of p as well: intuitively speaking, the present-tensed facts
that obtain in the fragment in which the time the utterance is talking
about is present.
I will exploit another distinction in Fine’s paper to make this point
more precisely: that between the topic and the target of a tensed utter-
ance. Roughly, the strategy will consist in adopting the following thesis:
Topic-correspondence The facts that correspond to a true proposition are
those individuated by the topic of an utterance that
expresses it.
Intuitively, each fragment is a present time, and from its perspective
(the current perspective) there are future and past facts only in the weak
sense, and no past or future entities. At least some of the fragments
contain facts concerning utterances presently obtaining. An utterance u
takes place in a fragment if and only if the fact that u is presently occur-
ring obtains within it. As I have noticed, although only facts obtaining
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within the fragment in which u takes place verify u, reality is constituted
by facts that obtain within other fragments too. The fragment in which
an utterance u takes place is the time of utterance of u. An utterance u
is about the time at which it takes place in the sense that the fragment
Fm in which u takes place is its target. The target of a true utterance u
is the fragment Fm in which we find
[the] facts that constitute how things are at the time [...] that are
relevant to determining whether the utterance is true. Normally
there is no need to be explicit about the target of an utterance,
since there is only one reality to which it can be directed. But once
we adopt a non-standard form of realism, the target is no longer
exogenously determined and must be regarded as a function of the
utterance itself. (Fine 2005: 296)
In other words, the target of an utterance u of a future-tensed sentence
is the fragment Fm in which the facts that verify the utterance obtain.
According to Fragmentalist Link those are only presently obtaining facts.
Thus, the target can contain only future facts in the weak sense. But
according to the fragmentalist reality is constituted by all other facts too:
among them we find the future facts in the strong sense that constitute
the topic of u. We can think of the topic of u as the fragment Fn where the
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fact which the proposition expressed is about obtains in its present-tensed
form. If the proposition is present-tensed, the topic Fn will be identical
to the target Fm, that is, the fragment in which a true utterance u takes
place will be also the one containing the facts that correspond to the
truth expressed by u. But if a true utterance u is past- or future-tensed,
the fragment in which u takes place will not in general contain the facts
that correspond to it.
Therefore, Topic-correspondence entails that the facts that corre-
spond to a true proposition p are not necessarily confined to those ob-
taining within the target Fm of the utterance u that expresses p. There
is clearly a relation of supervenience between the facts obtaining in the
topic-fragment Fn and the truth of p. If an utterance u of ‘Tomorrow
it will rain’ that takes place in a target-fragment Fm expresses a true
proposition p, then Fragmentalist Link tells us that within Fm there ob-
tain future-tensed facts that verify u, and Topic-correspondence tells us
that, in the topic-fragment Fn, there obtain present-tensed facts that
correspond to the true proposition p that u expresses. But if p were not
true, not only would the future-tensed fact that it will rain tomorrow
not obtain within Fm, but neither would the present-tensed fact that it
is raining obtain in the topic-fragment Fn. In other words, there is a
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modal correlation typical of a supervenience link between the present-
tensed facts occurring at present in the topic-fragment and what is true
about the future in the target-fragment in which the utterance is made.
Of course, within a fragment Fm in which a past- or future-tensed
true utterance u takes place, the facts that constitute the topic of u will
not generally obtain. And one may be suspicious about supervenience
relations between facts that obtain (those concerning the truth of the
proposition) and facts that do not obtain (those in the topic-fragment).
But note that, even within Fm, those facts belong to reality. Fragmen-
talism, unlike externalist relativism, has it that facts belong to reality in
an absolute sense. Hence, if they obtain within one fragment or another,
they will belong to reality absolutely speaking.
Finally, we can now see how the fragmentalist presentist can accept
past and future facts in the strong sense as what corresponds to the true
propositions that she is willing to accept. In the fragmentalist version,
CTT entails that what is true in a target-fragment supervenes on the facts
that obtain in the corresponding topic-fragment. Thus, if in a fragment
Fm an utterance u of ‘Tomorrow it will rain’ takes place and expresses
a true proposition p, what corresponds to such a true proposition is the
present-tensed fact that it is raining. This fact is future in the strong
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sense, since it is present-tensed and it will obtain in the future. But even
if within Fm it does not obtain, it can be what the true proposition p
corresponds to, since it belongs to reality all the same.
2Fragmentalist Presentism,
Branching Time, and Bivalence
2.1 Presentism and Bivalence
Presentism maintains that neither the past nor the future is real. It fol-
lows that there is no ground for future contingent claims. Those who
agree with this line of thought, while holding that for every true claim
there are facts in virtue of which the proposition it expresses is true, may
be tempted to think that future contingent claims are neither true nor
false, and thus to deny that the principle of bivalence holds unrestrict-
edly.15
15 See, for instance, Bourne (2006). In a similar vein, Le Poidevin (1991: 38)
observes that “[t]he extent to which the principle of bivalence is violated by state-
ments about the past or future depends, for [the presentist], upon how much causal
determinism he is prepared to allow. [...] In an indeterministic universe [...] many
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Of course, two ways to reconcile the former and the latter present
themselves quite naturally. Unfortunately, both come with a certain
theoretical cost. The first option is to endorse nomological determinism.
If present truths, together with the laws of nature, necessitate future
tensed truths, there is no reason to deny a determinate truth-value to
future contingent claims (Markosian 2013). But the issue of nomological
determinism vs. nomological indeterminism is an empirical one, and it
would be nice to find out whether the presentist could save bivalence even
if the universe we happen to live in turns out to have indeterminist laws.
Therefore, in what follows, I will assume that nomological indeterminism
holds and will not discuss this option further.
The second option is to introduce in the present reality a fundamental
ground for the truth of future contingents. The presentist could intro-
duce in her metaphysics “brute facts” about which history among all the
nomologically possible alternatives will be the actual one. If we repre-
statements about the future must [...] lack a truth-value”. To some extent, such a po-
sition might be thought of as sympathetic to Markosian (2013: 137)’s one. The latter
seems to think that within a presentist framework, if laws of nature turned out to
be wildly indeterministic, it would be impossible to evaluate contingent truths about
the past as true or false; and, I add, similar considerations could be easily applied to
future contingent claims.
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sent, as is customary, nomologically possible histories through a tree-like
structure, such brute facts would signal out a thin red line among all fu-
ture branches – i.e. the branch that will turn out to be the actual future
history of the world.16 Needless to say, such a move would be very costly
from a dialectical point of view, since it would commit us to inflate the
present with facts that the non-presentist can easily exclude from her
inventory of the world.
Eternalism seems to be better oﬀ, at least in its B-theoretic – i.e.,
tense anti-realist – version. Within a B-theoretic framework, every future
fact is future in the strong sense. Now, under the hypothesis that time
branches towards the future, the B-theoretic model can be interpreted
in two diﬀerent ways. According to the first one, the eternalist block of
16 See Prior (1967). Linear time is compatible with indeterminism, but it is usually
argued that to vindicate the intuition that the future is open we need branching
and bivalence failure (Belnap, Perloﬀ and Xu 2001, Belnap 2005, 2007, Borghini
and Torrengo 2012). See Barnes and Cameron (2009) and Benovsky (2013) for a
criticism of the idea; see Torre (2011) for an overview. Here, I am not interested in
whether branching or branching together with a thin red line vindicate any alleged
intuition about the openness of the future. Rather, my aim is to show that bivalence
and fragmentalist presentism are compatible even on the assumption of nomological
indeterminism and branching time.
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tenseless facts is taken to be a block multiverse. In this case, facts located
in diﬀerent branches will all obtain in diﬀerent alternative universes.
Therefore, a future contingent claim is neither true nor false simpliciter
and bivalence fails, although relative to one or another branch future
contingents will also have a determinate truth-value.17 According to the
second way, the branching model is thought of as the structure of the
canonical block universe; the B-theorist can adequately vindicate the
claim that one of the branches is the thin red line. If the framework
is B-theoretic, and tenseless facts are the most basic ones, there is no
objective fact of the matter about which instant is present simpliciter.
The notion of being present is understood in merely indexical terms,
and each instant is present when considered with respect to itself, and
past or future if considered with respect to instants that come before or
after it in the fundamental B-series. Therefore, we are allowed to take a
“God’s eye” view when providing truth-conditions for future contingents,
and attribute a determinate truth-value to each future contingent claim
depending on how things will actually be. The idea of a thin red line is
thus a viable option within a B-theoretic eternalist framework.18
17 See Saunders and Wallace (2008) and Wallace (ms.)
18 This point is discussed in detail in Borghini and Torrengo (2012), where it is
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Moreover, as seen in section 1.1, standard presentism cannot resort
to future facts in the strong sense in order to provide a proper ground
for future contingent truths. As I have put it, the distinction between
weak and strong facts is defined only for tensed facts, and hence, at the
fundamental level, it makes no sense for the B-theorist. But if she is
willing to accept tensed facts at a non-fundamental level, she will have –
relative to times and histories – future facts both in the weak and in the
strong sense. Imagine the fact that Alan is sitting at t and the fact that
Alan is standing at t0 constitute reality on a given history h, and that t0
is future with respect to t. At the non-fundamental level of tensed facts,
on h the B-theorist will have both the future fact that at t Alan will be
standing and the future fact that at t0 Alan is standing. Within such a
framework, the eternalist can hold that, for every time t considered as
present, there are many weak future facts, relative to each nomologically
possible history. However, relative to t, from a “God’s eye” view only one
also stressed that the same rationale would not hold in an A-theoretic framework.
In an A-theoretic framework, there is a fact of the matter as to what time is the
present. Hence, introducing a thin red line in the present moment would require the
introduction of further brute facts about which future branch will be (as of now) the
actual one. See also Øhrstrøm (2009).
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of those histories is the actual future; contrary to the standard presentist,
the eternalist has the resources to maintain that the actual future of t is
a succession of strong future facts.
The central thesis of this chapter is that, in contrast to the standard
version, fragmentalist presentism can be coupled with the idea that there
is a thin red line without inflating the ontology with brute facts about the
actual future. I will show how to fictionally order the fragments in a tree-
like structure that branches towards the future. As I will argue, under
the hypothesis that we live in a single universe (and not a multiverse),
not all the branches can be taken to be part of reality. Given that reality
encompasses a single time line, only the fragments belonging to a certain
branch are “out there”; only one branch is properly part of reality. Thus,
fragmentalist presentism allows us to develop an A-theoretic branching-
time model that is fully compatible with the thin red line. Within a
framework of this kind, one can finally adopt unrestricted bivalence for
future contingents.
2.2 Fragmentalism and the Flow of Time
Can fragmentalist presentism secure bivalence for future contingents more
easily than standard presentism? An obvious strategy to achieve this is
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to order the fragments in a sequence, which could play the role of a tem-
poral succession of instants ordered by an earlier-later relation. Through
such a “pseudo-B-relation” <ps, the fragmentalist can provide bivalent
truth-conditions for future contingents in the familiar way. Imagine that
two fragments F1 and F2 are such that within F1 all facts that obtain
at a certain instant t1 obtain, and within F2 all facts that obtain at a
certain instant t2 obtain. We can stipulate that F1 <ps F2 if and only if
t1 < t2. Then, a future claim ‘in the future, '’ is true in F1 if and only if
there is a fragment F2 such that F1 <ps F2, and within F2 the fact that
' obtains. By ordering the fragments we can put them to use as instants
in a standard semantics for tenses. I maintain that this idea is roughly
on the right track, even though there are at least three problems that it
must face.
Firstly, properly speaking <ps is not a temporal sequence, since it
holds between fragments and not between instants. Fragments are noth-
ing but collections of presently obtaining facts, and therefore no fragment
comes before or after another. Even worse, there are literally no facts
“connecting” them, since facts obtain only within fragments, and there is
no “uber-fragment” encompassing them all within which facts concerning
<ps can obtain. If so, one may wonder how such a view would vindicate –
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as tense realism in general aspires to do – the reality of the flow of time.
Secondly, and relatedly, the fragmentalist seems to accept explicit
quantification over fragments; as I have just said, ‘in the future, '’ is
true in F1 if and only if there is a fragment F2 such that F1 <ps F2, and
within F2 the fact that ' obtains. But if fragments can be quantified
over, and they can play the role that instants play in standard eternalist
B-theory, where exactly is the distinction between the two positions?
The whole picture of a presentist metaphysics starts to fade.19
Thirdly, even if the two former diﬃculties can be overcome, bivalence
for future contingents would be secured only if <ps is linear, that is if
the order of fragments is total. But why should that be so? After all –
as seen in the previous chapter – within each fragment the only future
facts we find are future facts in the weak sense, i.e., presently obtaining
future-tensed facts. Those future facts can be about a branching tem-
poral topology, rather than a linear one. Indeed, this is what we should
expect by expanding to the non-standard case the picture discussed at the
beginning. But if this is the story within each fragment, then it seems
that the relation <ps that holds between fragments should be equally
19 Tallant (2013) raises a similar complaint for non-standard forms of presentism
in general.
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branching towards one of its sides. If so, resorting to it clearly cannot
solve the problem of bivalence. What to do, then? In this section and in
the next one, I deal with the first two diﬃculties, while in section 2.4 I
will deal with the third one.
Whilst the second problem points at how to distinguish fragmentalist
presentism from the “block view”, i.e. standard B-theoretic eternalism,
the first one can be seen as a challenge to distinguish it from “the spot-
light view”, i.e. A-theoretic eternalism, in particular from its “super-time”
version.
As Brad Skow argues in a series of related articles on the spotlight
view,20 we can articulate the idea that the present (or the NOW, in his
terminology) moves from one instant to the next one in the temporal
series, by resorting to a further dimension – viz. super-time – in which
this movement takes place. Points in super-time are ordered by a relation
that “mimics” the linear topology and metric of B-series of instants. Thus,
from the perspective of a point of super-time Tn, an instant tn is present,
and all those coming before it (all tx such that tx < tn) are past, and all
those coming after it (all tx such that tn < tx) are future. This allows us
to provide an account of the flow of time as the movement of the NOW
20 See in particular Skow (2009, 2012).
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through the temporal series:
So with supertime we can make sense of the NOW’s motion: for the
NOW to move is to be located at diﬀerent times relative to diﬀerent
points of supertime. (Skow 2012: 224)
It should be quite clear that the super-time construal of the spotlight view
and non-standard tense realism bear similarities. Points of super-time
closely resemble fragments (or perspectives). As with fragmentalism,
facts obtain within fragments (and as with external relativism, reality is
constituted by tensed facts relatively to perspectives), in the super-time
story from the perspective of diﬀerent points of super-time, diﬀerent in-
stants are past/present/future, and hence (we can assume) certain tensed
facts rather than others obtain. Yet, there is a crucial diﬀerence between
the two views.
This diﬀerence has two aspects: Skow’s super-time is a metaphor 21
to explain the standard form of eternalist tense realism. Fragments and
perspectives are not meant to be metaphors, but to be fundamental in-
21 Skow’s super-time is not “hyper-time”, viz. a second dimension of time, as the
one sometimes discussed in the framework of time travel scenarios (see Meiland 1974
and van Inwagen 2009a). Rather, it bears similarity to Schleisinger (1991)’s modal
notion of “meta-time”.
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gredients of a metaphysical picture. But what is super-time a metaphor
of? The spotlighter has to be careful not to collapse the series of super-
time points with the actual B-series of instants, on pain of collapsing
her position into a form of B-theory in disguise. Thus, it cannot be a
metaphor of tenseless facts concerning which instants are past, present or
future relative to each other. But she must also be careful not to dupli-
cate time in her picture, by introducing a further actual temporal series,
in which the NOW can “flow”. The “third way” is to construe super-time
as a metaphor of irreducible tensed facts, expressed by primitive tense
operators.
Talk of the NOW’s motion is to be understood using primitive
tense operators [. . . ]. “The NOW is moving into the future” means
(roughly) “The NOW is located at t, and it will be the case that the
NOW is located at a time later than t.” (Skow 2012: 224)
That is why the metaphor is about a standard form of tense realism.
This is a crucial aspect of the view: in the standard picture, one time is
present simpliciter, and not relative to perspectives or fragments. The
movement of the NOW along the super-time series is thus a metaphor
for the changes in which facts are absolutely present. As Pooley rightly
notes in discussing Skow’s view, the problem is that there are still two
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times in this picture: there is the A-theoretic super-time, understood
in primitively tensed terms, and there is the B-theoretic time of the
temporal series on which the spotlight shines and moves.22
However, fragmentalist presentism is diﬀerent and it has to stand
no such charge. As a non-standard form of tense realism, it accepts
Neutrality. Within each fragment, only one instant t is present, and
all past-, present-, and future-tensed facts obtain at present. But all
fragments are on a par, and no one corresponds to what time is present
simpliciter. Hence, within each fragment time is A-theoretic: fragments
are constituted by irreducible tensed facts, and the flow of time is a
feature of reality within each fragment. In the fragmentalist picture there
is no movement of the absolute NOW along the series of fragments, and
hence there is no super-time. Yet, if I am right, there is a pseudo-B-
series. Thus, it seems that the fragmentalist has a two-time problem, all
in all. It is that while in the spotlight view super-time is A-theoretic and
normal time is B-theoretic, in the fragmentalist picture “super-time” (i.e.
the pseudo-B-series of fragments) is B-theoretic, while ordinary time (i.e.
22 Already Williams (1951) points out a similar problem for the view that he at-
tributes to McTaggart. Pooley (2013) dislikes the duplication of time because of the
epistemic problems it gives rise to (see Braddon-Mitchell 2004).
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time within each fragment) is A-theoretic.
But this distinction makes all the diﬀerence, because the fragmentalist
– unlike the super-time spotlighter – can avoid the two-time objection
by taking the ordering of fragments by <ps to be a fiction. Indeed, that
is precisely how I propose to solve the first predicament: <ps is not a
temporal series, but a fiction – a fiction that does not lead to a two-
time problem because, in contrast to super time, it does not encode an
A-theoretic dimension build on top of a B-theoretic block universe. But
how are we to recover the ordering of <ps, if reality is fragmented? It
seems that we are never in a position to recover at once all the elements
that we need to construct such series; there is no uber-fragment in which
facts concerning <ps can obtain. Pooley notices an analogous problem
with respect to the external relativist account of the passage of time in
terms of variation through diﬀerent temporal perspectives:
Does this variation with temporal perspective provide us with a
sense in which the non-standard view vindicates the passage of
time? There is an apparent problem with the suggestion that it
does. The variation is not itself a fact about how reality is. Our
model of the view includes such variation but [. . . ] features of the
model that transcend what is true from each temporal perspective
do not correspond to perspective-independent facts about reality.
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There are meant to be no such facts. (Pooley 2013: 336)
This is correct also for fragmentalism: the pseudo-B-series is not grounded
in facts connecting the diﬀerent fragments, and cannot be, since there
are no such facts. But this is how it should be. The story about <ps
is a fiction that is not grounded in such alleged facts. Nonetheless, the
fiction is justified by the very metaphysical hypotheses about temporal
reality that constitute the core of fragmentalist presentism. By facing
the second problem (how to diﬀerentiate fragmentalism-cum-<ps from
B-theoretic eternalism) and the third one (how to recover bivalence if
<ps is a tree-like order), I will also clarify how the fiction is to be con-
ceived.
2.3 Overlap and Branching Ordering
As said above, the dangerous proximity between the position I advance
and standard B-theory is given by the fact that I proposed to provide
bivalent truth-conditions for future contingents by quantifying over frag-
ments ordered by <ps. It should be clear from what I said at the end
of the previous section that this quantification is to be understood as
part of the fiction. But what is the reality behind this fiction? A hint
comes from Fine (2005: 281) himself, when he spells out the account
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of the flow of time in the fragmentalist picture: “Any fact is plausibly
taken to belong to a ‘fragment’ or maximally coherent collection of facts;
and so reality will divide up into a number of diﬀerent but possibly over-
lapping fragments” (italics mine). Roughly speaking, two fragments are
said to be partially overlapping if they share some tensed facts, such as
the fact that there were dinosaurs. Intuitively, the fragmentalist can hold
that, since a tensed fact of this kind is “temporal”, the relation of overlap
between these two fragments is suﬃcient to order them in a temporal
succession. Tallant contended that
[t]he trouble with such a proposal, aside from it being extremely
controversial, is that these facts are insuﬃciently refined to act as
suitable ground for true propositions about the past (and future)
and when they are replaced with facts that are suitable, we find
that the distinct fragments of reality will no longer overlap. (Tallant
2013: 293, italics in the original)
As an example, Tallant proposes to consider a true proposition like
‘Jonathan was hungry five minutes ago’. Its truth – he underlines –
cannot be adequately grounded by the tensed fact that Jonathan was
hungry, but rather by the more precise tensed fact that Jonathan was
hungry five minutes ago. To put it another way, the truth of ‘Jonathan
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was hungry five minutes ago’ cannot supervene on Jonathan’s having been
hungry, but must instead supervene on the more specific Jonathan’s hav-
ing been hungry five minutes ago. But it is easy to see that this more
specific tensed fact cannot overlap with the fragment that represents
how things will be in another minute’s time. For, in another minute,
the tensed fact that we will require is not Jonathan’s having been
hungry five minutes ago, but Jonathan’s having been hungry six min-
utes ago. (Tallant 2013: 294)
Nothing prevents us – Tallant concludes – from thinking of the fragments
as constituted only by more specific tensed facts of this kind. But then it
is hard to make sense to the claim that diﬀerent fragments can overlap.
Hence, the fragmentalist cannot explain how to order her fragments in a
temporal sequence.
I think that Tallant’s reply can be overcome. I am willing to admit
that there are many propositions whose truth supervenes on “more spe-
cific” tensed facts, such as the fact that Jonathan was hungry five minutes
ago. Consequently, I admit that we are required to think of fragments
as constituted by such metric tensed facts. However, I disagree about
whether this is suﬃcient for claiming that fragments cannot overlap. To
be clear about the point of my reply, consider a fragment Fn containing
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the tensed fact that dinosaurs became extinct at least 65 million years
ago. Given that tensed fact, in Fn the proposition ‘Dinosaurs became
extinct at least 65 million years ago’ is obviously true. Note that if in
Fn this proposition is true, then in Fn the proposition ‘Dinosaurs be-
came extinct at least 64 million years ago’ is also true, since the former
entails the latter. It follows that Fn must also contain the tensed fact
that dinosaurs became extinct at least 64 million years ago. Now, noth-
ing prevents the fact that dinosaurs became extinct at least 64 million
years ago from obtaining in another fragment – call it Fm. But then Fn
and Fm share at least one tensed fact, namely the fact that dinosaurs
became extinct at least 64 million years ago. In other terms, Fn and Fm
are partially overlapping.
We have no reason to exclude tensed facts like dinosaurs became ex-
tinct at least 65 million years ago from the inventory of what Tallant
calls “more precise” tensed facts. On the contrary, note that the former
can be thought of as supervening on the latter. After all, if it is true that
Jonathan was hungry five minutes ago, a fortiori it will be true also that
Jonathan was hungry at least five minutes ago.
As I have underlined in the previous chapter, since each fragment
contains no more than presently existing things, every past or future fact
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that we find in a given fragment is a past or future fact in the weak
sense: a presently obtaining past- or future-tensed fact. The same goes
for the “at least” tensed facts such as the ones I have just taken into con-
sideration: they are non-present weak facts and then the presentist can
accept them. The pseudo-B-series of fragment can then be reconstructed
out of the overlap of “at least” facts among fragments. Of course, I am
spelling out a fiction here: properly speaking, there are no facts about
the overlap of fragments, because those would obtain only within an in-
coherent “uber-fragment”. And yet this model encompasses overlapping
fragments. This is what the very hypotheses that fragments are consti-
tuted by “at least” facts, among other facts, let us conclude. Even more
interestingly for the present purposes, an order can also be reconstructed
in the case within each fragment the tensed facts are about a branching
temporal succession and the relation <ps is branching towards one of its
sides. But how exactly is the relation of overlap suﬃcient for ordering the
fragments along such a branching succession? Let us turn to a slightly
more regimented framework.
I introduce the sentential operator ATLEAST n, to be read infor-
mally as ‘at least n million years ago’.23 Given a present-tensed propo-
23 Or any other unit of time, such as days or seconds. Here I am taking into
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sition such as ‘Dinosaurs become extinct’, ATLEAST n(dinosaurs be-
come extinct) is to be read as the past-tensed proposition ‘Dinosaurs
became extinct at least n million years ago’. Now, consider for ex-
ample a fragment, F0, containing the tensed fact that dinosaurs be-
came extinct at least 65 million years ago, that is, a fragment in which
ATLEAST 65(dinosaurs become extinct) is true. Furthermore, while F0
contains the tensed facts that dinosaurs became extinct at least 64 mil-
lion years ago, that dinosaurs became extinct at least 63 million years
ago, and so on and so forth, it does not contain the tensed fact that di-
nosaurs became extinct at least 66 million years ago. Now, we can order
the fragments to be placed in the trunk whose upper bound is F0 (see
Fig. 1) by analysing how they overlap with F0.
More precisely, given a fragment Fn, it will be part of the trunk if and
only if it does not contain the tensed fact that dinosaurs became extinct
at least 65 million years ago. Conversely, it will be located in one of the
branches if and only if it contains the tensed fact that dinosaurs became
extinct at least 65 million years ago. Analysing the overlap relation also
allows us to determine the order in which the fragments are disposed
account the discrete case; the case of a dense time requires further complications that
fall beyond the scope of this thesis.
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Fig. 1. A branching succession of fragments with respect to F0
along the trunk. Take for example two fragments F 1 and F 2. Suppose
that F 2 contains the tensed fact that dinosaurs became extinct at least 63
million years ago, while F 1 also contains the tensed fact that dinosaurs
became extinct at least 64 million years ago. In other words, there is at
least one tensed fact obtaining in F0 that also obtains in F 1, but not
in F 2. In this case, F 1 will be closer to the upper bound than F 2
(in more formal terms, it holds that F 2 <ps F 1). To synthesise in
a motto: the larger the overlap, the smaller the distance to the upper
bound. This would suﬃce to order completely the fragment in the case
of linear time (i.e., if, within each fragment, time is linear). But if the
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future-tensed facts within each fragment are about a branching structure,
as I am assuming, we need some further refinement.
In order to calculate the distance (from the upper bound of the trunk)
of the fragments that are disposed along the branches we can adopt
the previous strategy, but calculating their distance to the upper bound
of the trunk may no longer be suﬃcient for pinpointing their location.
Consider Figure 1.24 Assume that both F1 and F2 contain the tensed
fact that dinosaurs became extinct at least 66 million years ago, and that
they do not contain the tensed fact that dinosaurs became extinct at least
67 million years ago. It follows that they are at the same distance to
F0. This is suﬃcient for determining their position (in this case, the
motto will be: the smaller the overlap, the larger the distance to the
upper bound), but only because they are directly connected to the upper
bound F0. But what about the higher branches? Consider F3 and F5.
Even though we are told that they are disposed to the same distance
to F0 (assume both that they contain the tensed fact that dinosaurs
became extinct at least 67 million years ago and that they do not contain
24 To keep things simple, I assume that F1 and F2 are the only “future” fragments
directly connected to F0. Analogously, I assume that in the “future” of both F1 and
F2 there are no more than two directly connected fragments.
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the tensed fact that dinosaurs became extinct at least 68 million years
ago), we cannot determine either whether F3 is connected to F1 or to
F2 or whether F5 is connected to F1 or to F2. To this end, we need a
slightly more refined method. My proposal is the following. Since – ex
hypothesi – F1 and F2 are two distinct fragments, there is at least one
proposition – call it p – such that if p is true in the former, then p is false
in the latter, and vice versa. Suppose that p is the proposition ‘Human
beings become extinct’ and that it is true in F1. It follows that in every
fragment connected to F1 it will be true that ATLEAST 1(p), while in
every fragment connected to F2 this proposition will be false. Hence, F3
will be connected to F1 if and only if it contains the tensed fact that
human beings became extinct at least 1 million years ago, while F5 will
be connected to F1 if and only if it does not contain this fact. This gives
us the ordering of the fragments in a branching structure.
The fiction of the branching pseudo-B-relation gives us what we need
to order the fragments in a way that mimics the temporal succession
within each fragment, which is the reality behind the fiction. The dif-
ference with respect to the B-theory is therefore profound. According
the the B-theorist, reality is constituted by all facts that obtain at all
times in a coherent whole (since those facts are tenseless). According
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to the fragmentalist, there is no such coherent whole, and the order of
the fragments is fictionally reconstructed from the information about the
overlap between fragments which we can recover from the tensed facts
that presently obtain within a given fragment. Unlike the fiction of super-
time, such a fiction is B-theoretic rather than A-theoretic, but it does not
surreptitiously reintroduce tenseless elements at the fundamental level.
The pseudo-B-relation is neither an irreducible tenseless relation nor a
non-fundamental relation that can be reduced to tensed facts. There are
no facts about <ps on which the fiction is grounded. The reality behind
the fiction is the collection of tensed facts that obtain within one frag-
ment. The hypothesis that reality is as the fragmentalist says – i.e. a
fragmented whole of coherent collections of tensed facts – licenses the
fiction of a series of partially overlapping fragments which reflects the
temporal series that we find within each fragment.
2.4 The Invisible Thin Red Line
As I have just stressed, the pseudo-B-relation mimics the temporal suc-
cession within each fragment. Therefore, since I have assumed that
within each fragment time has a branching topology, the fiction will be
about a branching ordering of fragments. In other words, <ps is a par-
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tial order, such that it is linear towards one of its sides, but non-linear
towards the other. If so, such a fiction seems to be useless for providing
bivalent truth-conditions for future contingents. Within each fragment
time branches, and no presently obtaining future-tensed facts are priv-
ileged in any metaphysical sense. As I have pointed out in section 2.1,
what we need is a thin red line that signals out the actual course of events
among all nomological possible alternatives. That is, we need a way to
express – in the fiction – which fragments contain facts that constitute
reality. We could, of course, insert a thin red line within each fragment,
just as the standard presentist can insert brute facts about which one
of the possible future histories will be the actual one. In that way the
fiction itself will contain a thin red line. But such a manoeuvre would
condemn any account of how to signal out a thin red line in the ordering
of fragments to be circular, or at any rate grounded on the very same
brute facts that we find within each fragment. As Pooley also notices,
the only information we can recover within each fragment is that a single
course of events will be the actual future, but not which one it will be.
[W]hile a given branching structure (absent a thin red line) does
not encode a single sequence of the kind we have been considering,
it does encode that the future tensed facts that hold at later and
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later times correspond to some such sequence. (Pooley 2013: 342)
To appreciate the point, remember that I am dealing here not with a
multiverse idea of reality, but with a single – albeit fragmented – universe.
If the reality of the fragmentalist is a multiverse in which every possible
future alternative actualises in some alternative universe, then there is no
reason to think that bivalence for future contingents should hold. In such
a case, the branching structure of fragments highlighted in the previous
section can be taken at face value – so to speak – to provide truth-
conditions relativised to histories, while leaving undetermined whether a
future contingent is true simpliciter within a given fragment. From the
point of view of each fragment the diﬀerent histories to which truth is
relativised represent the distinct universes, which are all “out there” in
the fragmented reality. Thus, although the branching order of fragments
would still be a fiction, every fragment that we postulate in the fiction
will correspond to a part of the fragmented reality, since in a multiverse
all nomologically possible alternatives will be realised.
Consider a very simple situation in which we ask whether in one unit
of time it will be the case that p within a fragment F0:25
25 I will employ the metric tense operator WILLn' to express that it will be the
case that ' in n units of time. The non-metric tense operator WILL' is defined in
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[WILL1p]F0 = ?
Assuming that p is contingent, there will be two (simplifying things)
future histories h1 and h2 such that according to h1 it will be the case
that p, and according to h2 it will be the case that ¬p. Following the
procedure described above (by resorting to the “at least” facts we find
in F0), we can construct a fiction in which two fragments F1 and F2 are
both at a distance of one unit from F0 and are such that within F1 it is
the case that p and within F2 it is the case that ¬p.
[p]F1
[¬p]F2
In the fiction, history h1 “passes through” F1 and history h2 “passes
through” F2 (see Fig. 2). Hence, while it is not settled whether within
F0 it will be the case that p in one unit time, the fiction of <ps allows us
to state that within F0 relatively to history h1 it will be the case in one
unit of time that p, while relatively to history h2 it will not:
[WILL1p]F0 = Ind
[WILL1p]F0, h1 = T
[WILL1p]F0, h2 = F
the usual way as: for some n, it is true that WILLn'. See Prior (1968).
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Fig. 2. h1 “passes through” F1, while h2 “passes through” F2
Notice that although histories are not fictional, since they are constituted
of future facts in the weak sense that obtains within F0, the trunk and
the branches constituted by succession of fragments are fictional, since
within each fragment presently obtaining facts are the only facts that
obtain, and in fragments such as F1 and F2 we find facts that do not
obtain at present (from the point of view of F0). Yet, on the assumption
that we live in a multiverse, we are justifying in taking the fiction as
corresponding to two distinct, but both actually existing, parts of reality.
After all, both histories will be actual, although in two diﬀerent universes.
The situation is diﬀerent if we live in one single universe with a single
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time line, and branching towards the future is just what reality is like
from the point of view of each fragment. In such a case, as we have
seen, the fiction that we can construct about the ordering of fragments
will contain the information that not all fragments that constitute the
diﬀerent branches are part of reality. In other words, we know that in the
fiction we are postulating more fragments than there actually are. We
can still relativise truth to nomologically possible histories, if we like, but
on the assumption that the fragmented reality is unique and encompasses
one single time line, we are not authorised to take all fictional branches of
fragments as part of reality. Although within each fragment all histories
are not fictional and equally on a par, we know that only one of the
branches is “out there” in the fragmented reality (see Fig. 3).
What, then, are the options for the fragmentalist who does not en-
dorse a multiverse view of reality? One is to exploit the fiction to provide
supervaluationist truth-conditions for future contingents. That would
save the law of excluded middle, but still jettison bivalence. Pooley
(2013: 343) seems to favour such an option, on the grounds that there is
neither a “global” point of view, nor an “end of time” perspective (“the end
of time is never reached”) from which we can reconstruct the information
about the whole of reality. In his words:
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Fig. 3. F1 lies on the thin red line
Just as the tensed facts that hold as of some time are not reducible
to tenseless facts, there is no need for them to be deducible from the
tensed facts that hold as of other times. As of t, it is neither true
nor false that there will be a sea battle at t0. As of t0, it is true that
a sea battle is raging. [. . . ] [I]t might seem that this open-future
version of non-standard A Theory better captures the passage of
time than a version in which the tensed facts as of one time can
be read oﬀ from those that hold at another. In the latter case, it
is hard to see what the insistence that such facts are not reducible
comes to, for there is a unique representation of reality – the block
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universe – from which the perspectival facts can be derived. This is
no longer true of the open-future model. The primordial branching
structure captures only how things might turn out, not how they
will turn out. (Pooley 2013: 342-343)
As I have already stressed in diﬀerentiating fragmentalism from standard
B-theory, I agree that, given the irreducible tensed nature of the facts
that obtain within each fragment, information about “future” perspec-
tives cannot be recovered from “earlier” ones (scare quotes are due, since
I am talking about the ordering of the fragment in the fiction of <ps).
And yet there is something puzzling in the idea that the fragmental-
ist picture “captures only how things might turn out, not how they will
turn out”. Although we are barred from recovering information about
the future, in the fragmentalist picture reality is not constituted by all
facts that, in the fiction, obtain within each fragment (unless we live in
a multiverse). Therefore, the very hypothesis that reality is fragmented
(and we do not live in a multiverse) elicits the idea that in the fiction
one of the branches must be singled out as the thin red line, i.e., the one
corresponding to the actual course of future events. Of course, such a
thin red line is epistemically inaccessible from within a single fragment,
since within each fragment the future is not real, and we have access only
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to facts that obtain in the fragment we find ourselves in. If we introduce
such a thin red line in the fragmentalist fiction of a pseudo-B-series of
fragments, then, it would be invisible at an epistemic level. Indeed, it
would be invisible even at a metaphysical level as well. Thus, our frag-
mentalist has the tools to formulate bivalent truth-conditions for future
contingents as follows (I employ 2ps ITRL to express the pseudo-relation
between fragments belonging to the invisible thin red line):26
[WILL']Fm = T if and only if there is a fragment Fn 2ps ITRL
such that Fm <ps Fn, and [']Fn = T
I agree with Pooley that we do not find facts about a thin red line either in
an “uber-fragment” in which all facts that constitute reality obtain (there
is no such incoherent thing), or in a fragment corresponding to the end
of time (“the end of time is never reached”). But in order to postulate
26 To repeat, here we are dealing with tensed facts constituting reality in an absolute
manner. The fact that we are required to evaluate WILL' with respect to a specific
fragment Fm does not conflict with the claim that to the fragmentalist presentist
bivalence holds unrestrictedly ; no more than the fact that we are bound to evaluate
the sentence – to say – ‘Alan is sitting’ relative to a given instant conflicts with the
claim that its truth supervenes on a tensed fact – the fact that Alan is sitting –
constituting reality in an absolute sense.
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a thin red line across the ordering of <ps we do not need further facts
that can ground it. As with the construction of the tree of fragments,
what we need is a justification to introduce such a fiction. And it is the
metaphysical hypothesis that reality is made of incoherent fragments in
which incompatible tensed facts obtain, together with the possibility of
cooking up a story about their ordering, that justifies (barring a multi-
verse) the introduction of an invisible thin red line in the fiction. Since
within each fragment the future branches, but ex hypothesi there is one
fragmented reality with one temporal dimension, it would be unfaithful
to the metaphysics presented here not to postulate it in the fiction.
That is why, as distinct from standard presentism, adding a thin red
line is no extra cost for the fragmentalist. In the standard picture, having
a thin red line entails accepting brute facts about what the actual future
will be within the perspective of the present time, which is the only real
perspective. But in the fragmentalist version of the story, we are not
required to accept facts about the actual future within each fragment. If
fragmentalism is true, we know that an invisible thin red line can’t fail
to be out there, since only the fragments that form a certain sequence in
the fiction are part of reality; all others are not part of reality at all. At
one point, Pooley seems to be sympathetic to such an idea:
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The model of the non-standard variant of the view does involve a
particular sequence [a sequence of perspectives that stands for the
actual future course of events]. Each element of it represents the
irreducibly tensed facts that hold as of some time. This might seem
to give us a more explicit representation of once open possibilities
being settled by the passage of time: what is indeterminate as of t
is settled in such-and-such a way as of t0. But care is needed: the
sequence of trees does not represent how reality is absolutely, as
conceived from no particular temporal point of view. (Pooley 2013:
342, italics in the original)
As we have seen, “care” pushes Pooley to reject the idea that the fact that
“the view does involve a particular sequence” justifies the endorsement of
a thin red line. That may be because Pooley uses a diﬀerent version of
non-standard tense realism (external relativism). Remember that while
both external relativism and fragmentalism accept Neutrality, external
relativism rejects Absolutism while fragmentalism rejects Coherence, as
I repeat below:
Absolutism The constitution of reality is an absolute matter, i.e. not rel-
ative to a time or other form of temporal standpoint.
Coherence Reality is not contradictory; it is not constituted by facts with
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incompatible content.
Thus, the fragmentalist does not accept that constitution of reality is ir-
reducible relative to fragments (or perspectives, or points in super-time,
or what have you); although she does relativise what facts obtain to
fragments: we are never allowed to claim that facts that we find in a
fragment diﬀerent from the one in which certain facts obtain also obtain.
The fragmentalist reality is not “of a piece” because as a whole it would
be incoherent, but it is nonetheless constituted by all tensed facts in a
absolute sense. On the other hand, in the external relativist picture,
tensed facts do not constitute one reality, since they only constitute re-
ality relative to perspectives. This makes a diﬀerence when it comes to
the fiction of ordering the fragment with <ps. In an external relativist
framework, it is not only that we do not find a global perspective or a
perspective as of the end of time, we do not find a reality constituted
by all the facts that we find along the thin red line, indeed along any of
the fictional fragments. Hence, in an external relativist framework the
postulation of a thin red line would be a fiction about a further reality
constituted by incompatible facts. This may be a price that someone
endorsing such a version of non-standard tense realism – as Pooley in
the paper we just quoted – may not be willing to accept. But in the
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fragmentalist version, since Coherence but not Absolutism is dropped,
the postulation of such a reality is no additional cost at all; indeed, an
incoherent but fragmented whole of incompatible tensed facts is the only
reality that the model posits. And although the metaphysical hypotheses
concerning such a reality entail that neither the branching order of the
fragments nor the branch that corresponds to the actual future can even
in principle be “seen” (since no facts that ground them obtain), those very
hypotheses entitle us to construct a fiction about a sequence of fragments
and an invisible thin red line.
3Fragmentalist Presentism
and Four-dimensionalism
3.1 Presentism and Four-dimensionalism
Four-dimensionalism – as it will be understood in this chapter – is the
view that reality contains instantaneous spatio-temporal parts, usually
called “stages”. Many four-dimensionalists identify the concrete particu-
lars, such as tables and persons, with mereological sums of stages from
diﬀerent times. Concrete particulars would perdure, that is, they would
persist by having diﬀerent stages (Lewis 1986: 202). Four-dimensionalism
is usually taken to be incompatible with presentism (Heller 1992). The
reason is that if there were no time except the present then nothing could
have more than one stage, the present one; but then nothing could be a
sum of stages from diﬀerent times.
Notoriously, the first serious attempt to overcome such diﬃculty was
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undertaken by Brogaard (2000), who oﬀered a temporal ontology – called
presentist four-dimensionalism – according to which concrete particulars
have
four dimensions in the sense that they have an unfolding temporal
dimension in addition to the three spatial ones [...] No stage is
wholly present at more than one time; every stage is wholly present
at exactly one time. There is a new stage for every moment at
which a given thing exists. (Brogaard 2000: 343)
And her reply to the claim that no object can genuinely perdure unless
it has more than one temporal part is the following:
This objection [...] rests on the idea that objects must have their
temporal parts in the same way that they have their spatial parts.
That is, temporal parts, like spatial parts, must exist in their en-
tirety. This does indeed hold of those smallest temporal parts which
are our successive stages. But it does not hold of temporal parts in
general. That this need not be a problem is seen in the fact that
events are commonly understood as having temporally extended
parts even though these never exist as a whole but only through
their successive stages. Similarly, objects, such as you and me, may
have extended temporal parts even though these are parts which
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exist always only in the sense that they unfold themselves, incre-
mentally, through their successive stages. (Brogaard 2000: 346)
I will not discuss Brogaard’s reply here. Rather, I aim to show that
fragmentalist presentism provides us with the tools to combine a presen-
tist metaphysics with four-dimensionalism, without rejecting the tenet
that “temporal parts, like spatial parts, must exist in their entirety”.
In what follows, I will take fragments to contain the stages that four-
dimensionalists usually describe as spread throughout spacetime regions.
The obvious reply to this move is that, according to standard four-
dimensionalism, nothing prevents an object from being a mereological
sum of stages belonging to diﬀerent times. But how can our fragmental-
ist presentist describe such a kind of entity if she maintains that, looking
from the inside of every fragment, only presently obtaining facts obtain?
After all, in section 1.2 I have characterised fragmentalist presentism as
the claim that, looking from (what Fine calls) the current perspective,
neither the past nor the future is real. The attempt to embrace a perdu-
rantist theory of persistence within such a metaphysical framework seems
hopeless. I completely agree. As far as we assume a standard version
of perdurantism, this reply cannot be bypassed. Still, the fragmentalist
has enough room for manoeuvre in defence of a non-standard version of
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perdurantism. Let us see how to develop it.
3.2 Fragmentalist Presentist Four-dimensionalism
First of all, we need to describe a temporal succession of instants contain-
ing the diﬀerent stages. What we need, in other words, is a sequence of
fragments ordered by an earlier-later relation. To this end, I will exploit
the pseudo-B-series described in sections 2.2 and 2.3. Now we can see
in what sense fragmentalist presentism is compatible with the existence
of perdurant objects, as far as it takes fragments to contain tensed facts
about stages. Even though, from the current perspective, no more than
one stage of a given object o is real, the fragmentalist ontology exploits
the resources of the fictional order of fragments (the pseudo-B-series) to
describe o as spread out over time. Consider the case in which Alan is
now running and then sitting and think of Alan as the sum of the stages
A1, ..., An. Whilst A1 has the property of being running, An satisfies the
property of being sitting. Our presentist will resort to two fragments,
F1 and Fn, such that F1 <ps Fn. F1 and Fn will contain, respectively,
all the presently obtaining facts about A1 and An. Both the present-
tensed fact that A1 is running and the present-tensed fact that An is
sitting constitute reality in an absolute sense. While the former obtains
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in the fragment F1, the latter obtains in Fn. Remember that, in light
of fragmentalism, reality is not confined to one fragment. Rather, is it
constituted by all the facts that obtain within each fragment. As I have
underlined in the first chapter, Absolutism does not contradict the as-
sumption that, in a sense, only the present is real: there is no fragment
in which both the fact that A1 is running and the fact that An is sitting
obtain, so that within F1 the strong future fact that An is sitting cannot
obtain. Similarly, within Fn the strong past fact that A1 is running does
not obtain. F1 will contain only the weak future fact that An will be
sitting (a presently obtaining fact); analogously, Fn will contain only the
weak past fact that A1 was running.
It should be clear from what I have said so far that, even though from
the general perspective every stage of Alan can be said real (since every
stage belongs to a fragment), the relation of mereological sum involving
the stages is part of the fiction. Properly speaking, no fact about the
mereological sum of stages can be grounded (reality is not of a whole).
Fragmentalist presentism requires us to think of concrete particulars as
fictional “worms” composed by real stages (belonging to diﬀerent frag-
ments); to synthesise in a motto: the parts are real, the whole is not.
Someone might now find tempting the following objection. Standard
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perdurantists claim that – in Sider (2001: 60)’s words – “it is spacetime
worms that are [. . . ] the referents of ordinary terms, members of ordinary
domains of quantification, subjects of ordinary predications, and so on”.
According to this view, an utterance of ‘Alan will be sitting’ is true if and
only if the mereological sum of A1, ..., An is composed by a future stage
that is standing. But, in the light of fragmentalist presentism, reality
cannot contain such an object: the sum is fictional. Within each frag-
ment no more than one stage of Alan is real. So, how can fragmentalist
presentism account for the truth of the utterance? Adopting the stage
view instead of standard perdurantism is no help whatsoever here: simi-
lar worries arise. Diﬀerently from standard perdurantists, stage theorists
claim that the referents of the objects we usually talk about are the single
stages, not the worms (Sider 1996, 2000, 2001).27 Thus, in evaluating the
truth of a present-tensed utterance they do not need to appeal to more
than one stage (the present one). Still, in evaluating as true or false a
past- or future-tensed utterance, they resort to an explicit quantification
over stages. As Sider (2000: 84) has it: “[A] current assertion of ‘Clinton
was indiscreet’ is true iﬀ the (current) referent of ‘Clinton’ – a stage –
has an indiscreet temporal counterpart in the past”. In other words, the
27 See also Hawley (2001).
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truth-conditions for past- and future-tensed utterances they propose re-
quire a B-theoretic succession of stages, which – as shown in section 2.3 –
is clearly incompatible with the fragmentalist picture. The fragmentalist
is never in a position to recover at once all the fragments that she needs
to construct a B-series.
This objection can be easily overcome in the following way. Granted:
in light of fragmentalist presentism, the truth of a given utterance should
be grounded in the facts obtaining within the fragment which the utter-
ance belongs to. Still, as I have argued in section 1.4, nothing prevents
our fragmentalist from distinguishing the supervenience base of a given
truth from its ground. Suppose that she is willing to say – in accordance
with stage theory – that the referent of ‘Alan’ is a single stage of Alan,
not the worm as a whole. She will maintain that the truth of an ut-
terance of ‘Alan is running’ both is grounded in and supervenes on the
fragment which the utterance belongs to. But what about the truth of
an utterance u of ‘Alan will be sitting’? She can claim that, even though
the fragment which u belongs to contains no ground for its truth, still –
looking from the general perspective – its truth supervenes on the strong
future facts involving – in Sider’s terminology – a temporal counterpart
of the present stage of Alan (in other words, presently obtaining facts
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located in fragments diﬀerent from the one which the utterance belongs
to).28
More precisely, the fragmentalist will claim that the truth of the
proposition u expresses in a given fragment modally co-varies with the
facts obtaining in the other fragments. If u expresses a true proposition
p in a fragment F1, even though within F1 we will find nothing but the
(presently obtaining) future-tensed fact that A1 will be sitting, there will
be another fragment, Fn, such that it contains the present-tensed fact
that An is sitting, that is, the fact which p corresponds to. Conversely,
if p were false we would find neither the future-tensed fact that A1 will
be sitting obtaining in F1 nor the present-tensed fact that An is sitting
obtaining in Fn.
What if our fragmentalist embraces the tenet that it is the spacetime
worm that is the referent of ‘Alan’, not a single stage? Again, in account-
ing for the truth of a given utterance, she should carefully distinguish
between its ground and its supervenience base. Reconsider the utterance
u of ‘Alan will be sitting’. Within the fragment which u belongs to no
mereological sum of A1, ..., An can be grounded. Still, the fragmentalist
can refer to the fragments containing all the other stages of Alan as the
28 Analogously, this strategy can be applied to an utterance of ‘Alan was running’.
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supervenience base of the truth of u. Among these fragments we will
find the one containing the future stage that has the property of being
sitting.
4Fragmentalism, Actualism,
and Quantified Modal Logic
4.1 Actualism and the Simplest Quantified Modal Logic
Actualism – in the way I will use the term in this chapter – is the thesis
that everything there is is actual.29 As Linsky and Zalta (1994) point
out, in order to appreciate the actualist tenet we should carefully dis-
tinguish between the two parts that comprise it. Firstly, the quantifier
‘there is’ should be understood as existentially loaded. It follows that
within an actualist framework there is no reason to think of ‘there is’
as distinct from ‘there exists’. In essence, the actualist picture is anti-
29 See Linsky and Zalta (1994: 436), Menzel (1990: 355), Adams (1974: 202),
Plantinga (1976: 257), Kaplan (1975: 220), and Loux (1979: 48).
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Meinongian, basically embracing Quine (1948)’s reading of quantifiers.30
Thus, actualism can equivalently be formulated as the thesis that every-
thing which exists is actual. Secondly, the claim that there are possible
but non-actual objects is false. For this reason, the actualist refuses to
quantify over possibilia (Linsky and Zalta 1994: 436).
Many actualists – who I’m going to label as standard actualists – re-
ject (at least) the simplest quantified modal logic (QML), which validates
the Barcan formula:31
(BF) 8x⇤'! ⇤8x'
Notoriously, there would be at least two (closely related) reasons for such
a rejection. First of all, theorems of the simplest QML would prove to be
incompatible with some actualist assumptions (Linsky and Zalta 1994:
436-438; see also Williamson 1998: 258). To appreciate the metaphysical
import of BF, consider the logically equivalent schema: ⌃9x'! 9x⌃'.
From the premise that it is (metaphysically) possible that I have a daugh-
ter, it follows by BF that there is an object that possibly is my daughter.
30 See also van Inwagen (2009b).
31 See Barcan (1946). For a detailed exposition of simplest QML, see Linsky and
Zalta (1994: 433-435). Throughout this chapter, I will assume no more than a minimal
acquaintance with modal logic, setting aside all the unnecessary technicalities.
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This is puzzling: I have no daughter, so what is the entity that satisfies
the property of possibly being my daughter? “On the plausible assump-
tion that one’s parentage is essential to one” (Williamson 1998: 258),32
it is clear that no actual object can bear this property. This is evidence
– standard actualists conclude – that BF is false (Linsky and Zalta 1994:
436-437, Williamson 1998: 258). Hence, whoever wants to adopt a pos-
sible world semantics within an actualist framework should give up the
simplest QML in favour of a semantics in which BF is invalid (Linsky
and Zalta 1994: 437).33 Note that the possibilist can easily avoid this
metaphysical conundrum. As underlined by Linsky and Zalta, she might
drop the assumption that ‘there is’ is existentially loaded, by introducing
in her language an existence predicate such that it cannot be defined by
using the quantifier ‘there is’. This would allow her to say that by BF all
that follows is that there is an object that possibly is my daughter. In
32 For a defence of origin essentialism see Kripke (1980). See also Salmon (1981)
and Forbes (1985).
33 Deutsch (1990), Fine (1977), Menzel (1990), Plantinga (1974), and Salmon (1987)
try to oﬀer a QML compatible with actualism by opting for a modified version of
Kripke-style semantics. In this thesis I will not consider these approaches: my aim is
simply to analyse the attempts to reconcile actualism with the simplest QML.
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contrast to the actualist, nothing compels her to claim that this object
also exists (pp. 435, 437).
Further worries arise in analysing the theorem:
(NE) 8x⇤9y y = x
Assuming that the quantifier ‘there is’ is existentially loaded, the formula
says that for any object x, x necessarily exists: a striking conclusion,
for it seems plausible that there are objects that exist contingently (pp.
437-438). Again, the possibilist seems to be in a better position than the
actualist. Taking ‘there is’ to be existentially unloaded, she might read
NE as simply saying that, for all x, necessarily there is x. There is no
reason why she should maintain that x necessarily exists (pp. 435, 437).
Within the possibilist framework, NE proves to be a simple platitude.
What about:
(BC) ⇤8x'! 8x⇤'
that is, the converse of BF? Linsky and Zalta (1994: 437) stress that,
in the simplest QML, NE is entailed by BC,34 so that in evaluating the
latter the actualist is bound to face – once again – the problems just
described in presenting the former.35 The possibilist – once again – might
34 See Deutsch (1990).
35 See also Williamson (1998: 258).
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oﬀer a more appealing metaphysical reading of BC, by assuming that
objects can bear properties also in worlds in which they do not satisfy the
existence predicate. Thus, BC will simply state that, if necessarily every
object satisfies a given property, then every object necessarily satisfies
that property (pp. 435). In the light of the possibilist reading, ‘every
object’ does not refer to everything which exists, but simply to everything
there is.
Note that the possibilist has the resources to evaluate BF, NE, and
BC as true even if – in accordance with the core idea of actualism – she
interprets ‘there is’ as ontologically loaded. Indeed, she might enrich her
inventory of the world with possible objects, in addition to the actual
ones (p. 435). In the light of the resulting view, it follows by BF that
there is a possible (non-actual) object bearing the property of being my
daughter. In evaluating NE – our possibilist might argue – the actualist
confuses the claim that every object necessarily exists with the claim
that every object is necessarily actual (p. 436). Thus, the fact that BC
entails NE does not raise any concern.
The second reason why standard actualists generally regard the sim-
plest QML as suspicious is that – in accounting for the truth of a given
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formula – it requires possible worlds to be included in the model,36 so
committing us to the existence of entities – the possible worlds – which
closely resemble possible objects. This is why actualists tend to adopt an
abstractionist approach to modal semantics. In other words, they tend
to think of possible worlds as nothing but abstract entities (p. 438).37
While standard actualists usually reject the simplest QML, attribut-
ing to it the unpalatable consequences just described, other philosophers
(who I will call non-standard actualists) try to reconcile it with actual-
ism. Roughly speaking, the move at the root of non-standard actualism
is to enrich the ontology with actually existing entities able to play the
same role played by non-actual entities in the possibilist interpretation
of modal semantics. Plantinga (1974) reinterprets possibilia as abstract
individualities (or uninstantiated haecceities). Unlike the former, the
latter are necessary entities; hence they cannot fail to be actual. Linsky
and Zalta (1994, 1996) and Williamson (1998, 2000, 2013) argue for a
diﬀerent strategy. They reject the idea that, for any entity x, x is either
concrete or abstract. In Linsky and Zalta’s words:
36 For the definition of the model see Linsky and Zalta (1994: 433-434).
37 In Adams (1974), for instance, possible worlds are defined in terms of maximally
coherent sets of propositions.
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The abstract/concrete distinction is mistakenly seen as an abso-
lute diﬀerence in the nature of objects. Thus, abstract objects are
thought to be essentially abstract, and concreteness is thought to be
part of the nature of concrete objects, something they couldn’t fail
to have (whenever they exist). We question these ideas by motivat-
ing and introducing what might be called ‘contingently nonconcrete
objects’. Contingently nonconcrete objects exist and are actual, and
they shall replace ‘possibilia’. (Linsky and Zalta 1994: 432)
By inflating her ontology with contingently non-concrete entities, the
non-standard actualist would have the resources to embrace the truth
conditions of modal formulae oﬀered by the simplest QML without ap-
pealing to non-actual entities. From a metaphysical point of view, this
strategy allows us to think of the truth of BF, NE, and BC as supervening
on nothing more than actual entities.
Now, it might seem that the only way of reconciling actualism and
the simplest QML is to enrich the actualist ontology with entities that
are by some means able to replace possibilia. To put it another way, it
is tempting to claim that whoever wants to reject the idea that there
exist non-actual objects without dropping the simplest QML is bound to
somehow modify the actualist inventory of the world by introducing fur-
Fragmentalism, Actualism, and Quantified Modal Logic 79
ther entities: either abstract individualities or contingently non-concrete
objects. In what follows, I argue that this temptation should be resisted.
Those who want to preserve the simplest QML have a third viable op-
tion between possibilism and non-standard actualism, which I will call
fragmentalist actualism, a view inspired by the modal analogue of Fine’s
fragmentalism (section 4.2). In contrast to the non-standard versions of
actualism, fragmentalist actualism maintains that reality contains nei-
ther abstract individualities nor contingently non-concrete objects. Like
possibilism – for reasons that I will analyse in section 4.3 – it allows us
to evaluate BF, NE, and BC as true. The claim that there exists such a
third view between possibilism and non-standard actualism might seem
puzzling. How can the fragmentalist actualist account for the truth of
a formula like BF? Doesn’t she simply lack the resources to adequately
replace possibilia? Without possibilia or their surrogates – it might be
replied – evaluating BF, NE, and BC as true seems hopeless! The present
chapter is devoted to the solution of this puzzle.
4.2 Fragmentalism and Modality
As seen in section 1.2, Fine calls fragmentalism the non-standard version
of tense realism that embraces both Absolutism and Neutrality, while
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rejecting Coherence.
Now, the realist approach can be extended to the treatment of modal-
ity. As Fine (2005: 284-285) underlines, both in the temporal case and in
the modal one “we have [. . . ] a certain aspectual feature [. . . ] [– respec-
tively, the tensed nature of facts and their being worldly (or contingent)
–] and an associated form of relativity” – the relativity being, respec-
tively, to a time and to a world. Taking the worldly facts to replace the
tensed ones, he reinterprets Realism and Neutrality as follows (p. 285):38
Worldly Realism Reality is composed of worldly facts.
Worldly Neutrality No possible world is privileged, i.e. the facts that
compose or constitute reality are not oriented towards
one possible world as opposed to another.
By exploiting the analogy between times and worlds, I will reinterpret
Absolutism as the following thesis:
Worldly Absolutism The constitution of reality is an absolute matter, i.e.
not relative to a world.
We can now give the modal analogue of the standard tense realism vs.
non-standard tense realism debate. In Fine’s words:
The standard realist will claim that there is a privileged world, namely
38 See also Fine (2006: 400).
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the actual world, while the non-standard realist will treat all worlds
on an ontological par (but still hold to the reality of worldly facts).
(Fine 2005: 285)
Call modal fragmentalism the non-standard realist view that rejects Co-
herence, while maintaining both Worldly Absolutism and Worldly Neu-
trality. The metaphysical picture is that the modal dimension is not
“of a whole”, but rather fragments into maximally coherent collections
of worldly facts – call them modal fragments. Each modal fragment is
as concrete as the one we inhabit: all the modal fragments are meta-
physically on a par. Modal fragmentalism may prima facie recall Lewis
(1986)’s concretism. The two theories bear similarities, if only in that
they share both Worldly Neutrality and Worldly Absolutism. However,
there is (at least) one crucial diﬀerence. The concretist thinks of worlds
as spread throughout a unified modal dimension; thus in providing truth
conditions for modal formulae nothing prevents her from genuinely quan-
tifying over them. Even though worlds are taken to be causally discon-
nected entities, she will claim that their mereological sum exhausts the
modal dimension. To the fragmentalist, there is no such sum. The modal
dimension is irreducibly fragmented and – so to speak – there is no meta-
physical “bridge” binding two or more worlds together: no metaphysical
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“conjunction” of facts belonging to diﬀerent worlds can obtain. Although
both the modal fragmentalist and the concretist think of the constitution
of reality as an absolute matter (bear in mind Worldly Absolutism), to
the concretist facts obtain simpliciter, while to the modal fragmentalist
they obtain only within a given world. Facts that obtain at worlds diﬀer-
ent from the one we inhabit constitute reality in the same sense as facts
that obtain at our world, i.e., absolutely. However, within each world not
all such facts obtain. In other words, not all facts that constitute reality
obtain in all the modal fragments.39
I suggest that the actualist can exploit this idea to adapt the gist
39 Another crucial diﬀerence is that the modal fragmentalist is not bound to adopt
Lewis’s counterpart theory. The latter posits that objects are world-bound: their
existence is limited to the world of which they are part. World-boundedness is required
to maintain – as the concretist does – both Worldly Absolutism and Coherence.
Suppose that Alan is a philosopher. Under the reasonable hypothesis that Alan
does not essentially have the property of being a philosopher, there is at least one
world w in which a counterpart of Alan is not a philosopher. The concretist resorts to
Alan’s counterparts in order to avoid the unwelcome conclusion that Alan – absolutely
speaking – both has and does not have the property of being a philosopher. In contrast
to the concretist, the modal fragmentalist drops Coherence; thus, nothing prevents
her from thinking of w as containing Alan himself.
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of the actualist position to modal fragmentalism, by embracing what we
might call fragmentalist actualism, that is, the view that within each
fragment an actualist ontology holds. In contrast to the concretist, the
fragmentalist actualist will claim that, looking from the inside of every
modal fragment, there is no non-actual entity “out there”, there is no
possible object located in a diﬀerent modal region, because no trans-
world fact about its existence can obtain. Looking from the inside of
the modal fragment we inhabit, there is no talking donkey “out there”,
even though the worldly facts concerning talking donkeys constitute re-
ality in an absolute manner. In the light of what I have said so far, it
should be clear that fragmentalism requires a form of double talk: the
absolute talk of constitution and the irreducibly relative talk of obtain-
ment. Remember that one of the ideas at the root of Fine (2005: 297)’s
fragmentalism is that “[i]n stating that a fact belongs to reality, we adopt
a general perspective, but in stating that a fact obtains, we adopt the
current perspective” (italics mine). In stating that there are no possi-
bilia, our fragmentalist adopts the current perspective – the perspective
centred on the modal fragment we inhabit. In stating that the objects lo-
cated in all the other fragments constitute reality in an absolute manner,
instead, she adopts the general perspective – the perspective centred on
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the (fragmented) modal dimension.40 Within the fragmentalist frame-
work, these perspectives both carve at the joints; they both mark two
metaphysically fundamental features: the absolute constitution of reality
and the limited obtainment of worldly facts.
Fragmentalist actualism is a genuine version of actualism, albeit a
peculiar one. It is crucial to stress that the assumption that the modal
fragments constitute reality in an absolute manner does not conflict with
the idea that, from the current perspective, everything there is is actual.
In section 4.1 I pointed out that, generally speaking, actualism can be
regarded as composed by the two following theses: (i) the quantifier ‘there
is’ is existentially loaded and (ii) no non-actual objects exist. In the same
spirit, the fragmentalist actualist maintains that, when the perspective
is centred on the modal fragment we inhabit, the thesis that everything
there is is actual should be understood as the claim that everything which
exists is actual. Given a modal fragment w, although – from the general
perspective – the objects belonging to all the other modal fragments
constitute reality in an absolute sense, they simply do not exist in w,
40 For the distinction between the perspective centred on a world and the perspec-
tive centred on the modal dimension, see what Solomyak (2013: 33-40) calls pluralist
view of the structure of reality.
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since facts about their existence cannot obtain. It follows that, from
the current perspective, it does not make sense to claim that there are
non-actual objects: if an object is not actual, then it does not exist.
The ontology to which the fragmentalist actualist is committed depends
on the facts about existence that she is willing to accept, i.e., that she
accepts as obtaining; as I repeat, while to the concretist obtainment is
absolute, to the fragmentalist actualist obtainment is always limited to
a given world.
4.3 Fragmentalist Actualism and the Simplest QML
As said in section 4.1, contingently non-concrete entities and abstract
individualities are generally introduced to provide actualism with the
tools to make sense of the simplest QML. But the fragmentalist actualist
can account for the truth of BF, NE, and BC without including such
entities in her inventory. Let us see how.
Concretists usually interpret the operators ‘necessarily’ and ‘possi-
bly’ as quantifiers over concrete worlds, that is, they take the evaluation
of modal formulae as presupposing an explicit quantification over such
concrete entities. Since the fragmentalist drops the idea that reality con-
stitutes a unity with respect to the modal dimension, she is never in a
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position to recover all the modal fragments at once. Still – from a seman-
tic point of view – she is not compelled to reject such an interpretation
of modal operators, in so far as she thinks of quantification over worlds
as fictional. Taking quantification to be nothing but a metaphor is jus-
tified by the very metaphysical hypotheses about modality at the root
of modal fragmentalism. Even though reality is indeed constituted by
all the modal fragments in an absolute sense, from the current perspec-
tive no fact concerning quantification over worlds can obtain. While the
concretist assumes that reality is genuinely unitary, to the fragmentalist
actualist such an assumption is nothing but a helpful fiction: in evaluat-
ing BF, NE, and BC in a modal fragment w she will regard the objects
belonging to all the other modal fragments – which, from the perspective
centred on w, do not exist – as mimicking possibilia. She will oﬀer – so to
say – a pseudo-possibilist reading of such formulae. Thus, from the fact
that it is possible that I have a daughter – by (the pseudo-possibilist in-
terpretation of) BF – it will follow that there is a “possible” object which
is my daughter; by ‘possible object’ she will refer to an entity located in a
modal fragment diﬀerent from the one in which BF is evaluated. NE will
no longer problematic either, for it will be read as simply stating that
every object necessarily exists. In so far as our fragmentalist embraces
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the fiction of a unified reality whose modal fragments contain possibilia,
she does not need to hold that everything is necessarily actual. Analo-
gously, in the light of the pseudo-possibilist interpretation of BC, the fact
that the latter entails NE will force our actualist neither to reject it nor
to enrich her ontology (with contingently concrete entities or abstract
individualities). She will accept that objects can also bear properties in
modal fragments in which they are mere “possible” things.
One might suspect that she is ultimately unable to account for the
truth of such formulae. The objection would go as follows. Under the
hypothesis that reality is irreducibly fragmented, the truth of a formula
' can be grounded in nothing more than the modal fragment in which
' is evaluated. Of course, this raises no problems in evaluating formulae
that do not contain modal operators, that is, formulae that do not quan-
tify over possible worlds. But what if ' is a modal formula? Granted:
she can make sense of QML by taking quantification over worlds to be
fictional. Still, she seems to lack the very metaphysical resources re-
quired to properly evaluate such a formula: she would need some sort
of link between objects belonging to the modal fragment in which ' is
evaluated and those belonging to all the other modal fragments (that is,
the objects mimicking possibilia), whereas she can at most resort to the
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grounding relation between ' and the single modal fragment in which it
is evaluated.
Such a suspicion can be easily dispelled by distinguishing between
the ground of a given truth and its supervenience base (so extending the
strategy presented in section 1.4 to the modal case). From the perspective
centred on the modal fragment we inhabit, nothing exists but actual
entities, and so, for each true formula evaluated in our modal fragment,
nothing but the modal fragment itself can function as a proper ground.
The fact that the truth of BF, NE, and BC cannot be grounded in the
modal fragment we inhabit does justice to the actualist intuition that
existence is somehow limited to the realm of actual things. Nevertheless,
the fragmentalist actualist can account for their truth by treating all the
other modal fragments as its supervenience base. As I repeat, while the
grounding relation between two facts, f1 and f2, presupposes the fact
that f1 is grounded in f2 (so requiring a metaphysical “bridge” between
f1 and f2), supervenience is nothing but a modal correlation. In other
words, in order for supervenience to hold between f1 and f2, only their
modal profiles are relevant, whereas grounding requires a further fact
linking them. In particular, a supervenience base for the truth of ' is
simply a set of facts S such that a change in the truth-value of ' requires
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a corresponding change in S. Thus, no relational fact between S and the
fact expressed by ' is required: supervenience can involve facts obtaining
in diﬀerent modal fragments, even though there is no trans-world fact
able to bind them together.
Of course, our actualist has no need to distinguish between grounding
and supervenience in analysing non-modal formulae, for the obvious rea-
son that their evaluation does not require to take into account more than
one modal fragment at once. Rather, the distinction is needed to account
for the truth of a formula such as ⇤'. Consider a modal fragment w.
Our fragmentalist will claim that, even though ⇤' cannot be grounded
in w, its truth modally co-varies with the facts obtaining in all the other
modal fragments. Namely, if ⇤' is true in w, reality will be constituted
by no modal fragment w0 such that ' is false in w0. Conversely, if ⇤'
is false in w reality will be composed by at least one modal fragment w0
such that ' is false in w0. Such a modal co-variation is precisely what
we should expect if a supervenience link holds between the truth of ⇤'
and the facts obtaining in all the other modal fragments.
References
Adams, R. 1974. ‘Theories of Actuality’. Noûs 8: 211-231. Reprinted
in M. Loux, ed. 1979, pp. 190-209.
Adams, R. 1986. ‘Time and Thisness’. In P.A. French, T.E. Uehling,
H.K. Wettstein, eds. Midwest Studies in Philosophy. Minneapolis:
University of Minnesota Press, pp. 315-329.
Barcan, R. 1946. ‘A Functional Calculus of First Order Based on Strict
Implication’. Journal of Symbolic Logic 11: 1-16.
Barnes, E., Cameron, R. 2009. ‘The Open Future: Bivalence, Deter-
minism and Ontology’. Philosophical Studies 146: 291-309.
Belnap, N. 2005. ‘Branching Histories Approach to Indeterminism and
Free Will’. In B. Brown, F. Lepage, eds. Truth and Probability:
Essays in Honour of Hugues Leblanc. London: College Publications,
pp. 197-211.
References 91
Belnap, N. 2007. ‘From Newtonian Determinism to Branching-Space-
Time Indeterminism’. In T. Müller, A. Newen, eds. Logik, Begriﬀe,
Prinzipien des Handelns. Paderborn: Mentis Verlag, pp. 13-31.
Belnap, N., Perloﬀ, M., Xu, M. 2001. Facing the Future. Agents and
Choices in Our Indeterminist World. Oxford: Oxford University
Press.
Benovsky, J. 2013. ‘Branching and (In)determinism’. Philosophical
Papers 42: 151-173.
Bigelow, J. 1996. ‘Presentism and Properties’. Philosophical Perspec-
tives 10: 35-52.
Borghini, A., Torrengo, G. 2012. ‘The Metaphysics of the Thin Red
Line’. In F. Correia, A. Iacona, eds. Around the Tree. Berlin: Syn-
these Library, Springer Verlag, pp. 105-125.
Bourne, C. 2006. A Future for Presentism. Oxford: Oxford University
Press.
Braddon-Mitchell, D. 2004. ‘How Do We Know it is Now Now?’. Anal-
ysis 64: 199-203.
Brogaard, B. 2000. ‘Presentist Four-Dimensionalism’. The Monist 83:
341-354.
Ciuni, R., Torrengo, G. 2013. ‘Presentism and Cross-Temporal Rela-
References 92
tions’. In R. Ciuni, K. Miller, G. Torrengo, eds. New Papers on
the Present. Focus on Presentism. Munich: Philosophia Verlag, pp.
211-251.
Correia, F., Mulligan, K. 2013. ‘Facts’. In E. Zalta, ed. The Stanford
Encyclopedia of Philosophy. http://plato.stanford.edu/archives/spr
2013/entries/facts/.
Correia, F., Rosenkranz, S. 2012. ‘Eternal Facts in an Ageing Universe’.
Australasian Journal of Philosophy 90: 307-320.
Deng, N. 2013. ‘Fine’s McTaggart, Temporal Passage, and the A versus
B-debate’. Ratio 26: 19-34.
Deutsch, H. 1990. ‘Contingency and Modal Logic’. Philosophical Stud-
ies 60: 89-102.
Fine, K. 1977. ‘Postscript: Prior on the Construction of Possible Worlds
and Instants’. In A.N. Prior, K. Fine, ed. 1977. Worlds, Times, and
Selves. Amherst: University of Massachusetts Press, pp. 116-161.
Fine, K. 2005. ‘Tense and Reality’. In K. Fine. Modality and Tense.
Oxford: Oxford University Press, pp. 261-320.
Fine, K. 2006. ‘The Reality of Tense’. Synthese 150: 399-414.
Forbes, G. 1985. The Metaphysics of Modality. Oxford: Oxford Uni-
versity Press.
References 93
Hawley, K. 2001. How Things Persist. Oxford: Clarendon Press.
Heller, M. 1992. ‘Things Change’. Philosophy and Phenomenological
Research 52: 695-704.
Kaplan, D. 1975. ‘How to Russell a Frege-Church’. Journal of Philoso-
phy 72: 716-729. Reprinted in M. Loux, ed. 1979, pp. 210-224.
Kripke, S. 1980. Naming and Necessity. Cambridge, MA: Harvard
University Press.
Le Poidevin, R. 1991. Change, Cause and Contradiction: A Defence of
the Tense-less Theory of Time. London: Macmillan.
Lewis, D. 1986. On The Plurality of Worlds. Oxford: Blackwell.
Linsky, B., Zalta, E. 1994. ‘In Defense of the Simplest Quantified Modal
Logic’. Philosophical Perspectives 8: 431-458.
Linsky, B., Zalta, E. 1996. ‘In Defense of the Contingently Concrete’.
Philosophical Studies 84: 283-294.
Lipman, M. 2015. ‘On Fine’s Fragmentalism’. Philosophical Studies
172: 3119-3133.
Loux, M. ed. 1979. The Possible and the Actual. Ithaca: Cornell.
Markosian, N. 2013. ‘The Truth About the Past and the Future’. In F.
Correia, A. Iacona, eds. Around the Tree. Berlin: Synthese Library,
Springer Verlag, pp. 127-142.
References 94
McTaggart, J.M.E. 1908. ‘The Unreality of Time’. Mind 17: 457-573.
Reprinted in R. Le Poidevin, M. McBeath, eds. 1993. The Philosophy
of Time. Oxford: Oxford University Press, pp. 23-34.
Meiland, J.W. 1974. ‘A Two Dimensional Passage Model of Time for
Time Travel’. Philosophical Studies 26: 153-173.
Mellor, D.H. 1986. ‘Tense’s Tenseless Truth-conditions’. Analysis 46:
167-172.
Mellor, D.H. 1998. Real Time II. London: Routledge.
Menzel, C. 1990. ‘Actualism, Ontological Commitment, and Possible
Worlds Semantics’. Synthese 85: 355-389.
Merricks, T. 2007. Truth and Ontology. Oxford: Oxford University
Press.
Øhrstrøm, P. 2009. ‘In Defense of the Thin Red Line’. Humana.mente
8 – Models of Time: 17-32.
Plantinga, A. 1974. The Nature of Necessity. Oxford: Oxford Univer-
sity Press.
Plantinga, A. 1976. ‘Actualism and Possible Worlds’. Theoria 42: 139-
160. Reprinted in M. Loux, ed. 1979, pp. 253-73.
Pooley, O. 2013. ‘Relativity, the Open Future, and the Passage of Time’.
Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 113: 321-363.
References 95
Priest, G. 1987. ‘Tense, Tense and Tense’. Analysis 47: 184-187.
Prior, A. 1967. Past, Present, and Future. Oxford: Oxford University
Press.
Prior, A. 1968. ‘Tense Logic and the Logic of Earlier and Later’. In A.
Prior. Papers on Time and Tense. Oxford: Oxford University Press,
pp. 116-134.
Quine, W.V.O. 1948. ‘On What There Is’. In W.V.O. Quine. 1953.
From a Logical Point of View. New York: Harper, pp. 1-19.
Rodriguez-Pereyra, G. 2005. ‘Why Truthmakers?’. In H. Beebee, J.
Dodd, eds. Truthmakers. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Salmon, N. 1981. Reference and Essence. Princeton: Princeton Univer-
sity Press.
Salmon, N. 1987. ‘Existence’. Philosophical Perspectives 1: 49-108.
Sanson, D., Caplan, B. 2011. ‘Presentism and Truthmaking’. Philoso-
phy Compass 6: 196-208.
Saunders, S., Wallace, D. 2008. ‘Branching and Uncertainty’. British
Journal for the Philosophy of Science 59: 293-305.
Schleisinger, G.N. 1991. ‘E Pur Si Muove’. The Philosophical Quarterly
41: 427-441.
Sider, T. 1996. ‘All the World’s a Stage’. Australasian Journal of
References 96
Philosophy 74: 433-453.
Sider, T. 2000. ‘The Stage View and Temporary Intrinsics’. Analysis
60: 84-88.
Sider, T. 2001. Four-Dimensionalism. An Ontology of Persistence and
Time. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Skow, B. 2009. ‘Relativity and the Moving Spotlight’. Journal of Phi-
losophy 106: 666-678.
Skow, B. 2012. ‘Why Does Time Pass?’. Nous 46: 223-242.
Solomyak, O. 2013. ‘Actuality and the Amodal Perspective’. Philo-
sophical Studies 164: 15-40.
Tallant, J. 2013. ‘An Heterodox Presentism: Kit Fine’s Theory’. In
R. Ciuni, K. Miller, G. Torrengo, eds. New Papers on the Present.
Munchen: Philosophia Verlag, pp. 281-306.
Tallant, J. 2015. ‘The New A-theory of Time’. Inquiry 58: 537-562.
Torre, S. 2011. ‘The Open Future’. Philosophy Compass 6: 360-373.
van Inwagen, P. 2009a. ‘Changing the Past’. In D. Zimmerman, ed.
Oxford Studies in Metaphysics, Volume 5. Oxford: Oxford University
Press, pp. 3-28.
van Inwagen, P. 2009b. ‘Being, Existence, and Ontological Commit-
ment’. In D.J. Chalmers, D. Manley, R. Wasserman, eds. Metameta-
References 97
physics: New Essays on the Foundations of Ontology. Oxford: Ox-
ford University Press, pp. 472-506. Reprinted in P. van Inwagen.
2014. Existence: Essays in Ontology. Cambridge: Cambridge Uni-
versity Press, pp. 50-86.
Wallace, D. ms. ‘Language Use in a Branching Universe’. http://philsci-
archive.pitt.edu/2554/.
Williams, D.C. 1951. ‘The Myth of Passage’. The Journal of Philosophy
48: 457-472.
Williamson, T. 1998. ‘Bare Possibilia’. Erkenntnis 48: 257-273.
Williamson, T. 2000. ‘The Necessary Framework of Objects’. Topoi 19:
201-208.
Williamson, T. 2013. Modal Logic as Metaphysics. Oxford: Oxford
University Press.
